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Sexual minority and transgender or gender diverse (SM-TGD) persons experience 
disproportionately high rates of mental illness, substance misuse, and suicide, which are often 
exacerbated by experiences of social exclusion and marginalization. While healthcare institutions 
are increasingly aiming to provide affirming mental health care to this population, many mental 
health services and practitioners remain unresponsive to SM-TGD individuals’ unique identities, 
needs, and experiences. Despite the fact that mental illness and access to adequate care are 
pressing concerns for this population, the ways that SM-TGD persons understand mental illness 
and their experiences navigating the healthcare system have not been adequately studied. Based 
on data from 12 qualitative interviews conducted in southern Ontario, this study explores the 
ways that SM-TGD individuals make sense of and contextualize their experiences of mental 
illness. This study also discusses some of the barriers to care often encountered by this 
population, and points to the ways that informal barriers such as microaggressions are as 
impactful as structural barriers, such as wait times. In doing so, this study aims to unveil the 
complex subjectivities that emerge when exploring the intersection of marginalized identities and 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
It is well documented that sexual minority and transgender or gender diverse (SM-TGD)1 
persons experience disproportionately high rates of mental illness (Canadian Mental Health 
Association [CMHA], 2017; Rainbow Health Ontario [RHO], 2015). Specifically, SM-TGD 
adults are more likely to experience depression, anxiety, self-harm, substance use and misuse, 
and post-traumatic stress disorder as compared to heterosexual and cisgender adults (Cochran & 
Mays, 2007; Diamant & Wold, 2003; McCabe et al., 2010). They are also significantly more 
likely to attempt suicide as compared to their heterosexual peers, with transgender people being 
particularly at risk of suicidality (ibid.). For example, a recent quantitative study conducted by 
Bauer and colleagues (2013) indicated that 43% of transgender adults in Ontario have attempted 
suicide at some point during their lives, and perhaps even more strikingly, that 32% did not see a 
health professional after the attempt. This points to the existence of barriers to accessing mental 
health support for this population.  
Similar disparities have been documented between SM-TGD youth and their heterosexual 
and cisgender counterparts. SM-TGD youth experience disproportionate rates of eating disorders 
(Watson et al., 2017), depression, anxiety, and substance misuse (CMHA, 2020). They are also 
more likely to experience suicidal ideation or attempt suicide, and rates of suicide attempts 
among certain groups of transgender youth in Ontario are as high as 57% (Bauer & Scheim, 
2015). Additionally, SM-TGD youth are disproportionately likely to experience homelessness as 
compared to heterosexual or cisgender youth (Abramovich, 2012), and often encounter homo- 
and transphobia when trying to access shelter services (Bauer et al., 2013). Support and 
 
1 SM-TGD is an umbrella term that encompasses all non-heterosexual and non-cisgender identities. It is an 
alternative to acronyms such as LGBTQ/LGBTQ2+/LGBTQIA, etc.     
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acceptance from family and friends are strongly associated improved mental and physical health 
and well-being among SM-TGD youth, and also correlate with lower rates of mental illness and 
substance misuse in adulthood (Ryan et al., 2009; Ryan et al., 2010). 
Although statistics only provide what queer researcher Zena Sharman (2016) has referred 
to as “an incomplete and highly oversimplified summary of some of what we know about queer 
and trans health disparities” (p.17), they nonetheless highlight mental illness and suicide as 
pressing concerns in SM-TGD communities. Research suggests that experiences of 
marginalization, stigma, discrimination, and social exclusion contribute to these disproportionate 
rates of mental illness (Dean, Victor, & Guidry Grimes, 2016; Meyer, 2013), as does a lack of 
access to economic resources (CMHA, 2017). Specifically, SM-TGD people may experience 
harassment, violent hate crimes, or bullying in schools (Dauvergne, 2010; Grant et al., 2011); are 
overrepresented in the lowest income categories (Bauer et al., 2010; Tjepkema, 2008); and may 
struggle to access stable housing and employment (Gapka & Raj, 2003). Negative social factors 
such as these are collectively referred to as minority stress and can have a detrimental effect on 
SM-TGD individuals’ physical and mental health over time (Meyer, 2003).  
This study examines SM-TGD persons’ understandings and experiences of mental illness 
in the context of continued societal marginalization and exposure to various forms of 
discrimination. In doing so, it investigates the ways that sexual or gender identity intersect with 
mental illness in potentially unique ways and contributes knowledge about individuals’ 
subjective experiences which are underrepresented in the literature.   
Research Problem  
Mental health is “rooted in complex structures of privilege and oppression” (Sharman, 
2016, p.15). This necessitates that healthcare practitioners and counselors working with SM-
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TGD individuals should strive to understand the systemic barriers and forms of marginalization 
this population faces (Shaughnessy, 2016). Care or therapy that integrates an awareness of the 
political and identity-specific issues relevant to SM-TGD people and that does not pathologize 
SM-TGD identities is referred to as affirmative (Alessi, Dillon, & Van Der Horn, 2019; Perez, 
2007). More specifically, affirmative psychotherapy can be defined as:  
the integration of knowledge and awareness by the therapist of the unique 
developmental and cultural aspects of [LGBTQ] individuals, the therapist’s own self-
knowledge, and the translation of this knowledge and awareness into effective and 
helpful therapy skills at all stages of the therapeutic process. (Perez, 2007, p.408)  
Affirmative therapy is linked to improved psychological well being for SM-TGD clients (Alessi 
et al., 2019) and stronger and more positive relationships between SM-TGD clients and 
therapists (Kelley, 2015).  
O’Shaughnessy & Speir (2018) argue that there has been a gradual shift to more 
affirming mental health care for SM-TGD individuals since the removal of homosexuality from 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) in 1973. They also note that 
significant attention has been paid to developing an evidence-base for affirmative therapy 
(O’Shaughnessy & Speir, 2018), which is reflected in the publication of a number of policy 
statements establishing guidelines and best practices for mental health professionals working 
with SM-TGD clients (DeBord et al., 2017)2. However, despite these positive shifts, many 
mental health services remain unresponsive to SM-TGD persons’ specific needs, experiences, 
and identities (Berke, Maples-Keller, & Richards, 2016). SM-TGD persons are more likely than 
 
2 See, for example, the position statement from the Canadian Psychiatric Association (Veltman & 
Chaimowitz, 2014) or The International Psychology Network for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex 
Issues (IPsyNet) Statement on LGBTIQ+ Concerns (IPsyNET, 2018), which the Canadian Psychological 
Association has endorsed. 
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their heterosexual counterparts report unmet mental health needs (Tjepkema 2008) and often face 
identity-specific barriers in accessing affirming mental health services (see O’Shaughnessy & 
Speir, 2018, for a systematic review of studies that address these barriers).  
Specifically, SM-TGD people often encounter subtle forms of discrimination or 
microaggressions when they seek treatment for mental illness or mental health concerns (see for 
example Dean et al., 2016; Kimber & Delgado-Romero, 2011; Nadal, 2013). Microaggressions 
may take the shape of gaps in practitioners’ knowledge, the use of hetero- or gender normative 
language, assumptions that patients or clients are heterosexual and/or cisgender, or practitioners’ 
assumptions that SM-TGD identity is the source of mental illness (ibid.), for example. While 
microaggressions may appear trivial, they can have an extremely negative impact on individuals’ 
emotional and psychological well-being when they occur frequently and across a variety of 
contexts (Dean et al., 2016; Nadal, Davidoff, Davis, & Wong, 2014). Consistently experiencing 
microaggressions in healthcare contexts can lead to SM-TGD individuals concealing their 
identities from practitioners or avoiding accessing care, even in the case of serious physical or 
mental health problems (ibid.).  
This study aims to contribute to the qualitative literature on the topic of access to 
affirmative mental health care that centers the voices of SM-TGD persons as opposed to that of 
healthcare practitioners or therapists. Understanding individuals’ subjective experiences is an 
important element of developing policies which are truly responsive to this populations’ needs, 
but these perspectives have been underrepresented in the literature. More specifically, a recent 
systematic review of empirical articles related to affirmative therapy for SM persons published 
between 2000 and 2015 and found that less than a third of the studies included service users’ 
perspectives (O’Shaughnessy & Speir, 2018). Other authors have also pointed to the relative lack 
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of studies on the topic of access to affirming mental health care which include SM-TGD client 
perspectives (Berke et al., 2016), especially in the case of transgender clients (eg. Israel, 
Gorcheva, Burnes, & Walther, 2008). Zena Sharman (2016) points to “the lifesaving necessity of 
queer and trans stories” (p.16) and argues that pairing research evidence with SM-TGD people’s 
experiential narratives can be a powerful means of contributing to social change. This study 
addresses this gap in that it centers the marginalized voices of SM-TGD individuals and includes 
perspectives from an equal number of cisgender and TGD participants.   
In addition to discussing some of the barriers SM-TGD individuals may encounter when 
trying to access affirming mental health care, this thesis also explores participants’ subjective 
understandings of mental illness and the ways that participants navigate biomedical 
categorizations of mental illness. Specifically, research indicates that, against the backdrop of 
continued stigma surrounding mental illness, having experiences which can be classified as 
mental illness or receiving a psychiatric diagnosis have important implications for individual 
subjectivity (Ottewell, 2018; Ringer & Holen, 2016; Tucker, 2009). It has also been well 
documented that individuals often make sense of their experiences of distress in ways that do not 
align with formal psychiatric definitions (Larson, 2004; Speed, 2006). However, many studies on 
the topic of individual or discursive sense-making around experiences of mental illness have 
focused on individuals’ relationships to a specific diagnosis, such as schizophrenia (eg. Tucker, 
2009) or psychosis (eg. Larson, 2004). This study instead explores processes of sense-making 
and their influence on subjectivity among SM-TGD individuals without a focus on specific 
diagnoses. In doing so, it aims to unveil the complex subjectivities that emerge when looking at 
the intersection of marginalized identities and understandings of mental illness.   
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Research Questions and Approach  
This study offers an in-depth exploration of two facets of experiencing mental illness or 
mental health challenges as a SM-TGD person: 1) the ways these individuals make sense of their 
experiences of mental illness and navigate biomedical categorizations of mental illness in 
relation to their subjectivities, and 2) the institutional and interpersonal barriers SM-TGD people 
often encounter when seeking affirming mental health care. In doing so, this study asks:  
1.  How do SM-TGD persons in southern Ontario relate to biomedicalized framings of 
mental illness in making sense of their experiences of distress and themselves? 
2.   How does SM-TGD identity feature in these processes?  
3.   What barriers do SM-TGD participants encounter when seeking affirming mental 
health care in their communities, and how do they perceive and navigate such barriers?  
In addressing these questions, this study takes a constructivist approach, which is 
attendant to the subjective and contextual meanings individuals assign to their experiences 
(Costantino, 2008; Charmaz & Bryant, 2016). Constructivism is premised on an acceptance of 
multiple realities that are socially constructed in interaction (ibid.), which enabled a focus on the 
ambivalence and conflict (Lupton, 1997) that often characterized SM-TGD participants’ 
linguistic accounts of their experiences.  
To address these particular concerns, the study draws on poststructural insights that focus 
on the role of language in constructing claims to truth and frames subjectivity as fluid, 
fragmented, and constituted in and through discourse (Fawcett, 2008; Fisher & Freshwater, 
2014). In the context of mental illness specifically, poststructural inquiries tend to emphasize the 
ways in which systems of categorization and labelling are discursively constituted and the impact 
those systems have on individual subjectivity (Fisher & Freshwater, 2014; Tucker, 2009). In this 
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sense, poststructuralism is a complementary lens for this constructivist study in that both 
perspectives reject the essentialization of experience (Constantino, 2008; Fisher & Freshwater, 
2014). They allow me, as a qualitative researcher who identifies as queer and who has 
experienced multiple forms of mental illness, to focus on and theorize participants’ complex and 
at times contradictory processes of sense-making as situated in discourse. A constructivist 
perspective also enabled me to illustrate the ways that formal or institutional barriers to affirming 
care may appear external to social practices but are instead constitutive of them (Ewick & Silbey, 
1998; Mezey, 2006).  
Outline of Chapters  
This thesis begins with a background chapter that offers an overview of common issues 
of access to affirming and high quality mental health care for SM-TGD people. This chapter 
includes a discussion of both structural barriers, such as wait times, and interpersonal barriers, 
such as microaggressions, and demonstrates the inseparability of these formal and informal 
barriers to care. Next, the methodology chapter outlines the methodological features of this study 
and offers a more detailed discussion of its epistemological and theoretical basis. This chapter 
also addresses the importance of researcher reflexivity in constructivist research and describes 
my positionality as a queer woman who has experienced mental illness and the ways that my 
identity may have impacted the study. 
The following two analytical chapters draw on empirical interview data to a) explore the 
complex relationship between dominant biomedical framings of mental illness and SM-TGD 
subjectivities, and b) provide an in-depth, experiential account of the barriers SM-TGD people 
face when seeking mental health support against the backdrop of institutionalized homo- and 
gender normativity. Specifically, chapter four discusses biomedicine as the dominant discourse 
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surrounding mental illness in the Global North3 and explores the ways that participants in this 
study took up and resisted elements of biomedical discourse when making sense of their 
experiences of mental illness and subjectivities. The chapter illustrates the fractured nature of 
subjectivity as it relates to mental illness and focuses on participants’ use of language as a 
window into the discursive constitution of subjectivity. Chapter five then explores the structural 
barriers and microagressions, or instances of discrimination, that participants in this study 
encountered in the context of mental health support services. The chapter also aims to illustrate 
the mutually constitutive nature (Ewick & Silbey, 1998; Mezey, 2006) of formal and informal 
barriers to affirming care and describe the ways that participants tried to mitigate or circumvent 
these barriers.    
Finally, the discussion offered in chapter six ties these two chapters together to illustrate 
the extent to which biomedical discourse around mental illness is hegemonic. The chapter also 
briefly discusses medicine’s function as an institution of social control as relevant to this study’s 
findings and explains the reasoning behind my theoretical decisions, which focus on lived 
experience as opposed to normalization through medicine. Chapter six concludes by arguing that 
normative heterosexuality has come to characterize the modern healthcare system (Fisher, 2013; 
Seidman, 2009), and this often leaves SM-TGD people in a double bind where their options for 
accessing care are both inadequate and few (Frye, 1983). In doing so, I emphasize the 
importance of research that centers the voices and experiences of SM-TGD people in advancing 
social justice and health equity for this population. 
  
 
3 Global North refers to the historically industrialized and urbanized countries of Europe and North 
America (Odeh, 2010; Pike, Rodríguez-Pose, & Tomaney, 2014). These countries are characterized by democracy, 
affluence, and technological advancement, and are alternatively classified as First World countries (ibid.).  
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Chapter 2: Background 
 As mentioned in chapter one, SM-TGD people in Canada experience both general and 
identity-specific barriers as they seek mental health support or treatment services. I discuss these 
various barriers, beginning with an overview of mental health in Canada and structural barriers 
to care that impact Canadians of all genders and sexualities. Specifically, this chapter first 
discusses wait times and the cost of therapy as barriers to accessing mental health supports. This 
chapter then discusses barriers to care which are specific to SM-TGD individuals. These identity-
specific barriers often take the form of microaggressions, or subtle, often invisible expressions of 
negative bias that contribute to instances of non-affirming or low-quality care. Such 
microaggressions tend to be categorized as either hetero- or gender normative (Nadal, 2013; 
Nadal, Rivera, & Corpus, 2010), and I will discuss several examples from each category.  
Mental Health in Canada  
 Experiences of mental illness can impact all Canadians, regardless of gender, sexuality, 
age, culture, and socioeconomic background (Mental Health Commission of Canada, 2013). 
Statistics Canada’s Canadian Community Health Survey - Mental Health (CCHS) is a large 
national survey that examines mental health and access to services in the Canadian population 
(Statistics Canada, 2013). One of the survey’s aims is to determine the prevalence of 6 specific 
mental and substance use disorders4 among Canadians, and results of the most recent survey 
(conducted in 2012) indicated that 1 in 3 Canadians met the criteria for at least one of those 6 
mood and substance use disorders at some point in their lives (Pearson, Janz, & Ali, 2013). Rates 
of annual as opposed to lifetime prevalence are somewhat lower (20% of people will experience 
 
4major depressive episode, bipolar disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, alcohol abuse or dependence, 
cannabis abuse or dependence, and other drug abuse or dependence 
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a mental illness or substance use problem in any given year, compared to a 33% lifetime 
prevalence (Smetanin et al., 2011)), but it is clear that mental health is a pressing concern for a 
relatively large proportion of the general Canadian population.   
Research indicates that SM-TGD individuals are not the only minority group in Canada 
to experience disproportionate rates of mental illness or substance use disorders. For example, 
Indigenous adults and youth experience significantly higher rates of mental health issues and 
deaths by suicide than non-Indigenous Canadians (Kielland & Simeone, 2014). This is also the 
case for racialized Canadians, who are more likely to experience mental health issues than White 
Canadians (CAMH, 2012; Flatt, 2013). Individuals from these marginalized populations can 
similarly face identity-based microaggressions in therapeutic contexts and require affirming 
mental health care that is tailored to their unique needs, identities, and experiences (Sue, 2010). 
As SM-TGD individuals may also be marginalized based on factors beyond sexual or gender 
identity, an intersectional approach that considers multiple elements of identity is critical to 
providing care that is truly affirming (Berke et al., 2016). 
Structural Barriers to Accessing Mental Health Care  
 One of the general or structural barriers to accessing mental health treatment that is 
relevant to all Canadians is seemingly mundane but nonetheless significant: long wait times 
(CMHA, 2017). While the length of wait times varies across the provinces and territories, 
individuals in some provinces face wait times of between 7 months and one year to access 
mental health services (ibid.). These wait times are not limited to a single form of mental health 
treatment; individuals may have to wait several months whether they are seeking counselling, in-
patient treatment, and/or access to psychiatry (ibid.). Unsurprisingly, long wait times and the 
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resultant delays in treatment are associated with poor outcomes among individuals who are 
experiencing mental health difficulties (Barua & Ren, 2016; Leobach & Ayoubzadeh, 2017). 
 Accessing private therapy is one means of potentially avoiding excessive wait times, as 
psychologists or counsellors working in private practice may have shorter waiting lists as 
compared to subsidized or community services (Israel et al., 2008). However, the cost of private 
counselling is prohibitive for many Canadians. While hourly rates for private counseling vary 
across organizations and practitioners, Canadians can usually expect to pay between $60 and 
$150 per hour-long session (Canadian Counselling and Psychotherapy Association (CCPA), 
2019). Some private practitioners charge fees on a “sliding-scale” basis where lower income 
individuals are able to access services at a lower cost, but this is not the case with all 
practitioners (CCPA, 2019; Israel et al., 2008). This leaves many Canadians in a position where 
they must choose between waiting to access a subsidized service or paying out of pocket for 
more timely private counseling.  
Microaggressions as Barriers to Affirming Care 
 SM-TGD individuals often encounter barriers to care that are specific to their 
marginalized sexual and/or gender identities. While instances of overt discrimination towards 
this population have become less frequent in recent decades, blatant prejudice has in many 
instances come to be replaced by subtler manifestations of negative bias (Nadal et al., 2010). 
Specifically, research indicates that SM-TGD individuals often experience what have been 
deemed microaggressions over the course of their daily lives and in therapeutic settings (Dean et 
al. 2016; Nadal et al., 2010; Shelton & Delgado-Romero, 2011; Nadal, 2013). While 
microaggression may appear trivial, they can have extremely negative cumulative impacts on 
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SM-TGD persons’ psychological and emotional well-being (Dean et al., 2016; Nadal et al., 
2014).  
Sue (2010) defines microaggressions as “brief and commonplace daily verbal, 
behavioural, and environmental indignities, whether intentional or unintentional, that 
communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative racial, gender, sexual-orientation, and religious 
slights to the target person or group” (p. 5). In contrast to overt discrimination or intolerance, 
microaggressions tend to be invisible and unintentionally conveyed (Dean et al., 2016; Shelton & 
Delgado-Romero, 2011). This is primarily due to the fact that microaggressions are embedded 
within broader racist, ableist, heteronormative, and homo/transphobic power structures (Shelton 
& Delgado-Romero, 2011; Nadal et al., 2010). These power structures position dominant 
identities (eg. White, able-bodied, straight and/or cisgender identities) as superior, and as the 
standard against which marginalized identities are compared and deemed abnormal, deviant, and 
inferior (ibid.)  
Since the socially constructed nature of normality and abnormality is obscured, dominant 
identities are taken for granted as superior and the default (Shelton & Delgado-Romero, 2011). 
Individuals cannot escape the “grip” of these forms of societal oppression and prejudice 
(McCullough et al., 2017), which means that biased views about minority individual or groups 
can operate “outside of immediate awareness”, even when they are in direct contrast to the 
values an individual believes themselves to hold (Shelton & Delgado-Romero, 2011, p. 211). 
Microaggressions can therefore be enacted unintentionally even by individuals who do not 
consciously take a negative attitude towards a particular marginalized group, or who are 
themselves members of that group (Dean et al., 2016; Nadal et al., 2014; Shelton & Delgado-
Romero, 2011).  
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Many authors have identified microaggressions relevant to SM-TGD populations 
specifically, focusing on these individuals’ negative experiences in daily life, healthcare spaces, 
and mental health care specifically (eg. Berke et al., 2016; Kimber & Delgado-Romero, 2011; 
Nadal et al., 2010; Nadal, 2013; Sue, 2010). Many of the microaggressions these authors have 
identified can be broadly categorized as expressions of either gender normative or 
heteronormative bias (Dean et al, 2016; Nadal et al., 2010; Shelton & Delgado-Romero, 2011). 
Such microaggressions are premised on the assumption that all individuals are heterosexual and 
cisgender until proven otherwise, and that this is the default and normal way to be (Dean et al., 
2016; Fisher, 2013). Gender and heteronormative microaggressions can be enacted during 
interpersonal interactions between SM-TGD individuals and others, as well as be embedded in 
physical spaces or the media present in those spaces. The remainder of this chapter will outline 
several common examples of microaggressions that SM-TGD persons often encounter in 
healthcare contexts.  
Gender normative Microaggressions 
Using TGD individuals’ preferred pronouns is a critically important part of providing 
affirming care for this population (Dean et al., 2016; Nadal et al., 2010; Nadal et al., 2014; 
McCullough et al., 2017). The inappropriate use of gendered pronouns when referring to TGD 
persons is referred to as misgendering and implies a gender normative bias because it is based on 
a healthcare practitioner’s assumption that a client is cisgender and/or identifies with a binary 
gender (ibid.). Some TGD people have encountered practitioners who refused to use their 
preferred pronouns (Dean et al., 2016), but this is less common than practitioners either not 
asking clients about their preferred pronouns or continuing to misgender clients even after being 
informed of their preferred pronouns. Misgendering serves to subtly invalidate or call into 
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question a client’s gender identity and can generate mistrust and a perceived lack of safety in 
relationships between practitioners and clients (Nadal et al., 2010; Nadal et al., 2014).  
Additionally, instances of misgendering do not only occur during interactions between 
TGD clients and their primary practitioners. As individuals accessing a healthcare service 
typically interact with at least one additional member of staff before engaging with their primary 
practitioner (eg. front desk staff, intake nurses etc.), TGD clients are faced with multiple 
opportunities to be misgendered over the course of a single visit to a healthcare practitioner or 
therapist (Israel et al., 2008). These clients may also have to disclose their gender identity and 
pronouns multiple times if that information is not kept on file or relayed to staff members who 
are likely to interact with the client (Baldwin et al., 2017; Berke et al., 2016). Unsurprisingly, 
this can generate feelings of anger, distress, hopelessness, and exhaustion among TGD 
individuals and further compound the emotional distress that led them to seek support services in 
the first place (Nadal et al., 2014).   
 The use of preferred as opposed to legal names is a second important means of 
demonstrating respect for a TGD individual’s gender identity (Israel et al., 2008; McCullough et 
al., 2017; Nadal et al., 2010). Using a TDG person’s legal name as opposed to their preferred 
name, whether intentionally or unintentionally, constitutes a gender normative microaggression 
(ibid.). Not being called by the correct name can lead to feelings of distress and a lack of safety 
for TGD individuals as they seek mental health supports (Israel et al., 2008). Conversely, 
research has demonstrated that being addressed by their preferred name is validating and 
affirming for TGD persons and contributes to them feeling less guarded in their interactions with 




SM-TGD individuals also frequently encounter evidence of heteronormative bias in their 
interactions with mental health practitioners and clinic staff (Alessi & al., 2019; Berke et al., 
2016; Dean et al., 2016; Nadal, 2013). Fisher (2013) notes that “in everyday life, heterosexual 
status is presumed and accrues privilege, and is regarded as ‘natural,’ ‘normal,’ and ‘morally 
superior,’ and often not in need of explanation” (p.502). This privileging of heterosexuality is 
often communicated through the use of heteronormative language, which constitutes a 
microaggression in the context of interactions with SM-TGD individuals. One key example of 
this type of microaggression is the use of heteronormative terms for patients’ or clients’ partners. 
Terms such as girlfriend, boyfriend, wife, husband etc. imply an assumption of an individual’s 
heterosexuality (as well as an assumption that the person’s partner identifies with a binary 
gender) (Dean et al., 2016; Shelton & Delgado-Romero, 2011).  
Heteronormative microaggressions can also take the form of practitioners’ inappropriate 
focus on an individual’s sexual and/or gender identity, or assumption that those identities are the 
cause of the difficulties the individual wishes to discuss in therapy (Berke et al., 2016; Israel et 
al., 2008; Shelton & Delgado-Romero, 2011). The literature indicates that SM-TGD persons 
often encounter and are negatively impacted by practitioners who take such a pathologizing 
attitude towards minority sexual and gender identities or who are poorly educated around the 
social and political realities that impact SM-TGD people (McCullough et al., 2017; 
O’Shaughnessy & Speir, 2018). SM-TGD individuals often express a strong preference for 
highly knowledgeable and experienced practitioners who are able to discern how and when an 




In addition to being enacted during interpersonal interactions, both gender normative and 
heteronormative biases can be embedded in healthcare environments via the physical elements of 
a space or any printed media present in that space (Berke et al., 2016; Dean et al., 2016; Israel et 
al., 2008). For example, intake forms, questionnaires, and other screening measures may have 
exclusively heteronormative response categories, or not have options for clients to indicate their 
pronouns or preferred named (ibid.). Additionally, pamphlets or brochures offered in clinic 
waiting rooms may be tailored exclusively to heterosexual and/or monogamous relationships 
(Dean et al., 2016; Shelton & Delgado-Romero, 2011), or health considerations relevant to 
cisgender people in heterosexual relationships. These environmental microaggressions signal to 
SM-TGD persons that they may not be welcome in a space and research indicates that overt 
environmental indications of inclusivity (stickers, appropriate pamphlets etc.) make many SM-
TGD individuals feel more comfortable (O’Shaughnessy & Speir, 2018; Quinn et al., 2015). 
Cumulative Impact of Microaggressions  
A significant body of literature indicates that while microaggressions may seem trivial or 
relatively innocuous, perhaps especially from a straight and cisgender person’s perspective, their 
cumulative effect can have an extremely negative impact on SM-TGD individuals’ physical, 
emotional, and mental health (Dean et al., 2016; Nadal et al., 2014). Frequently experiencing 
microaggressions in therapeutic contexts can generate mistrust between SM-TGD individuals 
and healthcare practitioners and leave the former feeling anxious, unsafe, and disrespected (Dean 
et al., 2016; Israel et al., 2008). Microaggressions can also result in SM-TGD persons not 
disclosing their identities to practitioners, terminating therapeutic relationships, and avoiding 
accessing care in the future (Dean et al., 2016; Israel et al., 2008; McCullough et al., 2017; 
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Quinn et al., 2015;), all of which are associated with decreased health and well being (Baldwin et 
al., 2017; McCullough et al., 2017). In this sense, microaggressions materialize as significant, if 
informal, barriers to care. 
This Study 
 Chapter five of this thesis discusses participants’ experiences with structural barriers to 
care and discriminatory interpersonal interactions such as those described here. In doing so, it 
aims to illustrate the inseparability of these two aspects and demonstrate that interpersonally 
enacted microaggressions materialize as a significant barrier to care. Chapter four of this thesis 
first foregrounds this discussion by exploring the ways that SM-TGD participants make sense of 
their experiences of mental illness, as partially mediated through their interactions with 




Chapter 3: Methodology 
 This constructivist-oriented study offers a situated account of SM-TGD people’s 
subjective experiences with mental illness that remains attentive to the researcher’s role in 
knowledge production (Costantino, 2008, Cresswell, 2009). I collected data for this study 
through unstructured qualitative interviews and conducted an abductive thematic analysis which 
allowed me to strike a balance between rich empirical description and theoretical generalization 
(Tavory & Timmermans, 2014). This chapter first outlines this study’s epistemological and 
theoretical underpinnings and their influence on the research design. It then emphasizes the 
importance of reflexivity to qualitative research and addresses my positionality as a researcher. 
Finally, this chapter outlines the study’s methodology, including sampling and recruitment 
strategies, data collection/generation via unstructured interviews, abductive data analysis, ethical 
considerations, and the trustworthiness of the project.  
Epistemological Approach and Theoretical Grounding  
This project is grounded in a constructivist epistemology. Constructivist approaches 
reject the notion of a single, independent reality that can be accessed or discovered through 
unbiased research (Costantino, 2008; Schwandt, 2014). Instead, constructivism is premised on an 
acceptance of multiple realities that are socially constructed in interaction (Costantino, 2008; 
Charmaz & Bryant, 2016). Knowledge of these realities is understood to be partial and situated, 
and researchers working from a constructivist paradigm aim to remain attentive to the subjective 
meaning individuals assign to their experiences as opposed to extracting unmediated truths from 
participants (Schwandt, 2014). Constructivist approaches to knowledge production also 
recognize that researchers play an active role in knowledge construction during the research 
process (Costantino, 2008; Charmaz & Bryant, 2016). 
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This epistemological standpoint infused all elements of the study’s design (Tavory & 
Timmermans, 2014). Firstly, I collected data for this study through unstructured qualitative 
interviews, which focused on the meaning participants assigned to their experiences and 
generated rich data appropriate for the type of analysis I intended to conduct (Costantino, 2008; 
Charmaz & Bryant, 2016). I then aimed to remain reflexive about the influence of my 
positionality on the data I co-constructed with participants (Watt, 2007), as well as the 
interpretive role I played during the process of data analysis (Lincoln et al., 2018). I used an 
abductive approach to data analysis that allowed insights to emerge from the data as opposed to 
imposing a theoretical framework (Tavory & Timmermans, 2014), and finally presented the 
study’s findings as a reconstructed and partial account of social reality that is concerned with 
subjective as opposed to objective meanings (Denzin & Lincoln, 2018).  
This project is grounded primarily in poststructuralism. Poststructural theories “tend to 
concentrate on the operation of language, the production of meaning, and the ways in which 
knowledge and power combine to create accepted or taken-for-granted forms of knowledge and 
social practice” (Fawcett, 2008, p. 666). Specifically, discourses, which are embedded in and 
operate through language, position certain knowledges as dominant while marginalizing others 
and create taken-for-granted knowledges and social roles that influence social relations, 
institutions, and individual subjectivities (Berbary, 2017; Fisher & Freshwater, 2014). In the 
context of mental illness specifically, poststructural inquiries tend to emphasize the ways in 
which systems of categorization and labelling are discursively constituted, and the impact of 




 The aims of this study required that I collect rich data on a particular topic from a specific 
population of individuals. Hence, and as is typical in qualitative research, I purposefully selected 
research participants whose identities and experiences align with the research problem this study 
addresses and who were willing to discuss their experiences in significant detail (Cresswell, 
2009, Palys, 2008). As this research is based in constructivism and therefore aims to an offer in-
depth and situated account as opposed to comprehensive or generalizable results (Constantino, 
2008), I did not intentionally seek either a representative or homogenous sample of the local SM-
TGD community. I instead used two broad inclusion criteria to select research participants: a 
queer identity and experience with mental illness or a mental health problem, challenge, or 
concern.  
Inclusion Criteria: Queer Identity 
Queerness as a concept and an identity has undergone significant shifts in recent years 
and is now employed in a number of different ways. Though queer identities are included in 
broader definitions of the SM-TGD community (i.e., the Q in LGBTQIA+ stands for queer as 
well as questioning), queer identities are also sometimes considered distinct from other non-
normative sexual and gender identities (ALGBTIC LGBQQIA Competencies Taskforce, 2013). 
Queer identities were historically understood to transcend specific gender and sexual identities 
and encompass any non-heterosexual or non-cisgender identity (Watney, 1994). Identifying as 
queer often also signaled that an individual subscribed to a certain set of anti-oppressive or social 
justice-oriented politics (ibid.). Queerness is ultimately a complex concept in that exists as a 
distinct identity, sometimes with certain political connotations, but remains at odds with 
traditional identity politics in that it does not have a clear set of parameters.  
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However, queer is increasingly being used as an umbrella term for a wide variety of non-
normative sexual and gender identities (ALGBTIC LGBQQIA Competencies Taskforce, 2013). I 
discovered during the interview process that the majority of my participants understood the 
concept of queerness in this way and used the term interchangeably with a wide range of sexual 
and gender identities. This necessitated a significant shift in the framing and focus of the entire 
project and also shed light on how my personal understanding of queerness and the meaning that 
I assign to my own queer identity informed my original research questions. Specifically, I had 
initially been interested in the potentially unique and politically informed ways that queer-
identified persons understand what it means to experience mental illness. However, as only three 
of my research participants identified specifically as queer, my focus on queerness as a distinct 
and politicized identity was no longer appropriate. Reflecting an emergent research design that 
allows for such shifts over the course of the research process (Cresswell, 2009), I redefined my 
population of study to include all SM-TGD identities and did not assume that my sample would 
include individuals who shared a certain set of politics.  
Inclusion Criteria: Experience of Mental Illness 
One my research aims was to explore the “process of self-formation that is mediated by 
exposure to discourse and incorporation of those knowledges into a concept of self” (Henderson, 
2015, p.326). While I was interested in this process as relative to biomedical discourse 
specifically, I also hoped to include individuals who understood emotional distress through other 
frameworks in order to explore the ways that biomedicine may still inform those other ways of 
knowing. With that in mind, I invited individuals who self-identified as having experienced a 
mental health problem, challenge, concern to participate in the study (see Appendix B for 
recruitment materials) and made it clear that a formal/clinical diagnosis was not required. I 
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hoped that this would allow me to recruit individuals who interpreted emotional distress through 
a psycho-social lens (Ringer & Holen, 2016) or who positioned themselves as service users 
instead of patients (Speed, 2006), for example, in addition to those who understood distress in 
primarily biomedical terms. 
Recruitment  
 I recruited participants through a closed queer Facebook group specific to Kitchener-
Waterloo. As a previously accepted member of the group, I did not need to navigate access or 
engage with a gatekeeper (Cresswell, 2009). I had intended to post my recruitment materials in 
several other local Facebook groups and also engage in snowball sampling, but my initial posting 
garnered responses from 12 interested individuals within 24 hours. Knowing that 12 interviews 
would generate sufficient data for the type of analysis I intended to conduct, I did not use any 
other means of recruitment. I acknowledge that recruiting participants exclusively through social 
media has limitations, but I felt that recruiting more than 12 participants would hinder my ability 
to conduct sufficiently rigorous and thorough data analysis given the time constraints of the MA 
thesis option program. That said, recruiting participants via this Facebook group was a means of 
efficiently accessing hundreds of diverse SM-TGD persons which would have otherwise been 
difficult to do given the lack of queer spaces and events in Kitchener-Waterloo.  
Final sample 
My final sample included individuals who identified with a range of sexual orientations 
and gender identities. In terms of sexual orientation, three participants identified as queer, three 
as bisexual, three as pansexual, two as lesbian, two as gay, two as asexual or ace, and one as 
fluid. Some participants identified with more than one of these categories, and most had 
experienced a shift in their sexual identities over time. In terms of gender identity, my final 
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sample included five trans-identified individuals, one genderqueer individual, and six cisgender 
individuals. More specifically, the sample consisted of two non-binary trans individuals, one 
trans man, one trans-masculine individual, one individual who identified simply as trans, one 
genderqueer individual, five cisgender women, and one cisgender man. I acknowledge that the 
study does not include the voices of trans women or trans-feminine individuals, which is an 
important limitation that I hope can be addressed in future research on this topic.  
In terms of other demographics, participants in this study ranged in age from 19 to 45, 
with the majority of the sample falling between the ages of 19 and 30. Seven participants 
identified as White, one as Chinese, one as Jamaican, one as Brazilian, one as Middle 
Eastern/Palestinian, and one as Indigenous. Seven participants were students at the time the 
interviews were conducted and the other five all had some form of post-secondary education. 
Though higher education is one indication of a middle-class identity, several participants had 
student loan debt and others mentioned having experienced financial hardship at some point in 
their lives. Several participants also discussed their financial stability as partially contingent 
upon family support. Overall, these factors suggest that this is a highly educated but not 
exclusively middle-class sample.  
Although this study primarily discusses SM-TGD individuals as a single population, it is 
important to acknowledge that this is not a homogenous group. As scholars of intersectionality 
illustrate (Crenshaw, 1991; Kerner, 2016), various aspects of identity intersect to produce 
distinct experiences of marginalization and inequality. For example, SM-TGD individuals can 
experience discrimination and mistreatment as a result of their race, ethnicity, socioeconomic 
status, age, or ability in addition to homophobia and transphobia (Ghabrial, 2017; Worthington & 
Strathausen, 2017). It is also well documented that these factors can impact SM-TGD 
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individuals’ specific needs around mental health services (ibid.). A detailed intersectional 
analysis was unfortunately outside the scope of this study, but there is a need for future research 
that is attentive to the way that SM-TGD individuals’ experiences with and understandings of 
mental illness may be impacted by other marginalized elements of identity.  
Data collection 
 Data for this study were collected via unstructured qualitative interviews that allowed me 
to generate robust data related to participants’ subjective experiences and processes of meaning-
making (Costantino, 2008). I also wrote fieldnotes after each interview and kept a research 
journal as a part of the process of data collection and as a reflexive exercise. This section offers 
an overview of the data collection process as well as a discussion of my positionality as a 
researcher and my reflexive practices.   
Unstructured Interviews 
 Data collection for this study consisted of unstructured interviews conducted between 
September and November 2018. Interviews ranged in length from 55 minutes to nearly two 
hours, and each was held at a quiet location of the participant’s choosing. Nine participants chose 
to meet for the interviews at my office on the University of Waterloo campus and the remaining 
three interviews were conducted in cafes. Each participant was given a $50 gift card of their 
choosing in recognition of the time commitment and level of emotional engagement involved in 
the interview process. I scheduled interviews several days apart whenever possible in order to 
allow myself time for reflection after each interview (Watt, 2007), as well as to generate detailed 
fieldnotes and engage in both personal and analytic journal writing. This writing allowed me to 
make note of emerging patterns as part of an iterative process of data collection and analysis 
(Cresswell, 2009).  
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I chose to conduct unstructured as opposed to semi-structured interviews in part because I 
wanted to avoid posing questions that imposed my own language or conceptual systems upon 
participants (Pawson, 1996) and in part to leave control of the interview conversation firmly in 
the hands of participants (Corbin & Morse, 2003). Given the power imbalance often embedded 
in traditional researcher-participant relationships (Aull Davies, 2008; Liamputtong, 2007), I 
wanted to position interviewees as experts on their own experiences and give up some of my 
own power by taking a less active role in the interview (Hoffman, 2007). I allowed participants 
to “[set] the boundaries of privacy and exposure” (Ewick & Silbey, 1998, p.25) during the 
interview conversations and aimed to make myself somewhat vulnerable in turn by explicitly 
acknowledging my own anxiety as an interviewer (Corbin & Morse, 2003). That said, I also let 
participants know that I could pose direct questions if a more structured interview would be most 
comfortable for them. Ultimately, some participants discussed their experiences in detail with 
minimal prompting on my behalf, while my “footprint” (Pezalla et al., 2012, p.9) and presence as 
a more directive force is visible in interviews with less talkative participants. 
After a few warm-up questions intended to build comfort and rapport, I began each 
interview by asking the participant to “start from the beginning” of their experiences with 
emotional distress, wherever they understood that beginning to be. In most cases, this led 
participants to spontaneously discuss their family situations, their experiences coming out and 
shifts in their sexual or gender identity over time, their interactions with support services and any 
experiences of discrimination, and any diagnoses they had received. The other question I asked 
all 12 participants was whether they identified as having a mental illness. Participants’ responses 
to this question typically helped illustrate their relationship to biomedical categorizations without 
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me having to ask directly and also tended to spark a discussion of how participants felt about 
their distress and/or diagnoses.  
I also anticipated that difficult emotions might arise during some of my conversations 
with participants and this further informed my decision to conduct unstructured interviews. I did 
not want to shy away from emotional disclosures or generate data that neglected the importance 
of emotion, but also aimed to ensure that any particularly emotional discussions were entirely 
voluntary by letting participants guide the interview conversations. Zena Sharman (2016) writes 
that “while there is a rich and growing literature on queer and trans health, [it] seems to me that 
people’s stories are missing from a conversation that’s often centered on things like research data 
and guidelines for health care providers” (p. 11). With this in mind, I aimed to use the 
unstructured interviews to elicit emotional expression as a form of important data (Hoffman, 
2007) while still ensuring that any particularly difficult discussions happened on participants’ 
own terms.  
Field notes and research journal 
I also took field notes and kept a research journal during my fieldwork. I approached this 
preliminary writing in part as a generative practice (Watt, 2007) or method of inquiry 
(Richardson & St. Pierre, 2018) that allowed to develop my ideas and engage in an ongoing and 
recursive process of data collection and analysis. My fieldnotes also allowed me to keep a record 
of the context in which the interview conversations happened, though I did not consider these 
notes to be objective descriptions so much as partial accounts mediated by my own perceptions, 
interpretations, and decisions about what features of the interview interactions were most 
significant (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 2011). My fieldnotes ultimately included information 
about the participant’s visible emotional state (facial expressions, body posture, tone, etc.), their 
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style of engagement and apparent level of comfort with me, and any instances of distress or 
particularly intense moments. 
My research journal was more personal and documented the emotions I experienced over 
the course of my fieldwork. Overall, the fieldwork entailed a significant amount of emotional 
labour in that I had to simultaneously make decisions around my own emotional expression and 
serve as both an interviewer and a supportive ear (Hoffman, 2007). While I did not want to 
appear indifferent or uncaring when participants discussed difficult experiences, I also did not 
want to take up too much space during the interview conversations or become significantly 
emotionally overwhelmed (Dickson-Swift et al., 2006; Hoffman, 2007). Journaling allowed me 
to think critically about how I was engaging emotionally over the course my fieldwork and also 
gave me a place to express some of the difficult emotions I experienced in response to 
participants’ disclosures. 
Keeping a research journal was also an exercise in reflexivity in that it allowed me to 
think critically about how my identity, assumptions, past experiences, and current actions and 
interview techniques were influencing my research. Reflexivity can be defined as the “ongoing 
analysis of relationships, power dynamics, and purposes of researchers” (Finley, 2008, p.98) 
over the course of the research process (Leavy, 2014; Lincoln et al., 2018). Constructivist 
approaches “[lead] researchers to locate themselves within inquiry” (Charmaz & Bryant, 2016, 
p.350) and are attentive to the ways that researchers’ backgrounds, values, and experiences shape 
research efforts, from the selection of a topic through to interactions with participants and the 
presentation of a narrative in the final manuscript (Lincoln et al., 2018). Though constructivist 
researchers do not aim to control for bias or assume that it is possible to produce objective 
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knowledge, thinking reflexively about the researcher’s impact on the research process is a still 
considered to be a key element of trustworthiness (Pezalla et al., 2012; Watt, 2007).  
One key element of reflexivity in the context of qualitative research is positionality 
(Leavy, 2014). Positionality refers to the “situatedness of knowledge” (Finley, 2008, p.98) and 
the ways that an individual’s “embodied, social, intellectual, and spatial locations” (ibid.) impact 
their worldview, approaches to knowledge construction (Tisdell, 2008), and political power and 
social privilege relative to others (Finley, 2008). Given how meaningful and relevant this project 
is to me and based on my desire to conduct anti-oppressive research, I aimed to carefully 
consider the role my positionality may have played over the course of my research. I had also 
hoped to embrace the feminist practice of threading in information about my experiences, 
emotions, and relationships with participants throughout the thesis (Preissle, 2008) as opposed to 
simply including a list of my social locations and a few limited musings about their relevance to 
the project. 
However, it became clear near the beginning of my fieldwork that I needed to maintain 
some emotional distance between myself and my participants, and later, between myself and the 
data I was transcribing and analyzing, in order to protect my own mental health and be able to 
complete the project. This was a very difficult realization to come to. I felt like I was not 
conducting “proper” anti-oppressive research and that erasing my emotional presence from the 
completed work was doing a disservice to the participants who were willing to share very 
intimate information with me. I also worried that the credibility of my thesis would be called into 
question if I did not consistently and transparently discuss the impact of my identity on my work, 
especially given the postpositivist tendency to view shared identities between researchers and 
participants as a worrisome source of bias. 
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So, though I remain reluctant to discuss my positionality in the form of a bounded 
statement, I will. I am a White, middle-class, highly educated, straight-sized, cisgender woman, 
able-bodied at present, with typically invisible mental health challenges. My queerness is central 
to my identity, but I can pass as straight should I choose to. I have the financial resources to 
access affirming services for my mental illness and acceptance and emotional support from my 
family. I have experienced discrimination based on my sexual identity, but not physical violence, 
and the homo- and transphobia I have experienced in my interactions with healthcare 
practitioners has usually been subtle and has never risked my physical or emotional safety. I also 
come from an educated and privileged enough position that I am able to advocate for myself as a 
queer person in healthcare contexts and be taken seriously. 
Queer identity and experiences of mental illness or emotional distress are two 
marginalized characteristics I have in common with my participants. I chose to disclose these 
two facets of my identity in order to facilitate trust between myself and participants and give up 
some of the power I am afforded by my more privileged social locations. I also thought critically 
about the ways my personal experience with mental illness and related interest in the 
medicalization of distress may have influenced the interview conversations and impacted how I 
interpreted and represented my research data. I was particularly concerned that I might be 
interpreting participants’ stories through the lens of my own similar experiences and consistently 
revisited the interview transcripts to confirm that my analysis of certain segments of text seemed 
to authentically represent participants’ intended meanings (Lietz, Langer, & Furman, 2006).   
Data analysis 
 I used a form of abductive thematic analysis to analyze the data for this study. Thematic 
analysis can be defined as “a method for identifying, analysing, and reporting patterns (themes) 
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within data” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p.79), and in my case involved transcription of the 
interview audio files, immersive reading and generation of individual interview summaries, and 
writing memos about emerging concepts and themes. Abductive analyses depart from more 
traditional inductive approaches that privilege emerging empirical insights by avoiding extensive 
forays into the literature at the outset of a project (Tavory & Timmermans, 2014). Abduction 
instead assumes “extensive familiarity with existing theories at the outset and throughout every 
research step” (Tavory & Timmermans, 2014, p.173). While this theoretical knowledge on the 
researcher’s part necessarily informs the research, it is not intended to rigidly determine the 
direction or limit the scope of the analysis (ibid.). In my case, I was quite familiar with the 
literature around SM-TGD mental health, the history of biomedicine, and poststructural 
approaches to subjectivity at the outset of this project. This knowledge was relevant at all stages 
of the research process and I did not wait until the end of my data analysis to begin theorizing the 
study’s findings. The following section outline the various steps of my analysis.  
Transcription  
Transcription is a key element of data analysis in that it allows researchers to familiarize 
themselves with their data and begin the process of pattern-finding and interpretation (Bird, 
2005; Lapadat & Lindsay, 1999). To that end, all 12 interviews were audio-recorded with 
participants’ consent and later transcribed verbatim by either myself, in some cases with the help 
of an automatic transcription software, or by a paid transcriptionist. I acknowledge that using a 
paid transcriptionist or software adds a layer of complexity to the transcription process since 
transcription is an interpretive act as opposed to simply a technical one (Bird, 2005; Tilley, 
2003). I made the decision to do so when I found that I was consistently struggling to keep up 
with transcription while also coping with the emotional impact of the interviews. This helped 
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reduce the burnout I was beginning to experience and allowed me to focus on the more intensive 
elements of data analysis. 
I made decisions about how and what to transcribe that aligned with both my theoretical 
orientation and the type of data analysis I intended to conduct (Lapadat & Lindsay, 1999; 
Roulston, 2010). Specifically, I approached the interview data as necessarily situated in the 
specific dynamics the participant and I co-created (Roulston, 2010) and therefore my transcripts 
include pauses, laughter, and notes about tone or inflection. Including these non-verbal elements 
in the transcripts offers a richer and more complex account of the interview conversations by 
retaining some the context in which the interview talk took place. I carefully compared all the 
transcripts I had not personally transcribed to the audio files from each interview in order to 
ensure accuracy and make sure that these non-verbal elements were included. This process of 
checking the transcripts also allowed me to gain familiarity with the interviews I had not 
transcribed myself (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Rubin & Rubin, 2012). 
Close Reading and Individual Summaries 
Next, I conducted a close, immersive reading of each transcript in order to further 
familiarize myself with the data, make note of patterns I noticed across various transcripts, and 
identify key quotations that exemplified patterns or were particularly insightful (Braun & Clarke, 
2006; Rubin & Rubin, 2012). I also generated individual interview summaries (Rubin & Rubin, 
2012) that included an outline of each participant’s social locations, their family background, the 
specifics of their queer identity, the trajectory of their experiences with distress or mental illness, 
and the types of services they accessed with an accompanying timeline. It quickly became clear 
during this preliminary analysis that there were a striking number of commonalities across 
various participants’ experiences, so keeping a concise record of each participant’s personal 
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details helped me remain attentive to the distinct personal and emotional contexts in which 
similar experiences occurred.  
Concepts and Themes  
After this initial close reading and process of note taking, I began to distill the patterns I 
had noticed into concepts, or “broad ideas summarized briefly as nouns [or] noun phrases” 
(Rubin & Rubin, 2012, p.155). I consistently revisited the interview transcripts to identify key 
quotations and examples for each concept and confirm that the concepts I was identifying and 
defining were supported by the data (Braun & Clarke, 2006). I then further distilled these 
concepts into themes, which “[capture] something important about the data in relation to the 
research question, and [represent] some level of patterned response or meaning within the data 
set” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p.82). I generated a memo for each developing theme or emerging 
insight (Tavory & Timmermans, 2014) and recursively compared the data both within and across 
the themes to identify any that needed to be collapsed or teased apart (Braun & Clarke, 2006).  
After having identified a number of well-defined themes, I conducted a more targeted 
literature review so as to situate my findings within the current literature and engage more 
theoretically with the themes I had identified (Tavory & Timmermans, 2014). The themes and 
findings I present in this thesis ultimately aim to “develop a double story: one part empirical 
observations of a social world, the other part a set of theoretical propositions” (ibid., p.5). In line 
with a constructivist approach, I consider myself to have played an active role in defining, 
theorizing, and representing these findings (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Costantino, 2008). My 
analysis does not seek to “pronounce the last word” (Fisher & Freshwater, 2014, p.204) so much 




Concepts such as reliability, validity, and generalizability that are typically used to 
assess rigour in quantitative research are not effective or appropriate when it comes to addressing 
issues of quality in qualitative research (Lietz, Langer, & Furman, 2006). These concepts are 
fundamentally incompatible with the epistemological basis of constructivism in particular, which 
rejects the idea that research can generate knowledge which speaks to a single, objective truth 
(Constantino, 2008). That said, it is certainly still important to ensure that qualitative research 
has been conducted with integrity and generates knowledge that authentically represents 
participants’ experiences and stories (Lietz et al., 2006). To that end, concepts such as 
trustworthiness, authenticity, or transferability have been offered as more applicable alternatives 
to the quality measurements used in quantitative research (Lincoln et al., 2018; Spencer, Pryce, 
& Walsh, 2014).  
I aimed to ensure the trustworthiness of this study in two ways. Firstly, I aimed to 
become thoroughly familiar with my data so as to be “immersed enough in participants’ 
experiences so as to credibly represent and interpret them” (Spencer et al., 2014, p.83). Secondly, 
I carefully considered the concepts of self-reflexivity and transparency (Tracey, 2010), which 
emphasize the importance of the researcher critically assessing and then being truthful and 
transparent about the impact of their motivations, strengths, shortcomings, mistakes, and 
positionality at all stages of the research process. As mentioned earlier, the writing I did in my 
research journal was ultimately an exercise in both self-reflexivity and transparency. I recorded 
the procedural details of the interviews and my developing analysis without glossing over my 
mistakes and uncertainties. I also wrote quite extensively about the emotional impacts of 
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conducting the interviews and the ways in which my own mental health at times compromised 
the thoroughness of my work.  
Ethical considerations  
My population of study and overall research topic both present important and distinct 
ethical considerations. Below I discuss some of the key concerns that emerged during the 
research process, which orient primarily around marginalization, the emotional impact of the 
interviews, anonymity and confidentiality, and reciprocity.    
Marginalization 
SM-TGD people remain marginalized based on sexual orientation and/or gender identity 
despite documented gains in LGBTQ rights (Knauer, 2012), and factors such as socio-economic 
status, age, ability, religion, or race/ethnicity can further this marginalization (CMHA, 2017; 
Ghabrial, 2017). Additionally, even heterosexual and cisgender individuals who experience 
mental illness often experience marginalization and stigma in various contexts (Ringer & Holen, 
2016). Ultimately, participants in this study experience several intersecting axes of 
marginalization which necessitated that I carefully consider any possible harms that could be 
perpetuated by this study and remain aware of the power imbalance that could exist between 
myself and less privileged participants. Making explicit my own marginalized identity as a queer 
woman who has experienced mental illness was one way that I aimed to remain attentive to this 
issue, as was my use of unstructured interviews which granted participants increased control over 
the interview conversations. 
Emotional impacts 
The research topic also posed distinct ethical considerations in that talking about difficult 
experiences could be distressing or triggering even for individuals who are not otherwise 
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marginalized. I aimed to address this risk first through a robust and transparent informed consent 
process (Corbin & Morse, 2003). My informed consent form made the topic of the interviews 
extremely clear, and I also verbally rearticulated that participants were free to direct the 
conversation, decline to answer any question, stop the interview at any time, and ask about my 
identity and experiences so that the interview conversation was not one-sided. However, I 
ultimately aimed to respect participants’ agency and autonomy by trusting that individuals would 
only request to participate in the study if they were comfortable discussing sensitive or 
distressing experiences with a researcher (Corbin & Morse, 2003; Liamputtong, 2007).  
Anonymity and confidentiality  
Protecting participants from exposure and adequately safeguarding their data are key 
elements of all ethical research (Corbin & Morse, 2003). I aimed to protect participants’ 
identities and ensure confidentiality to the greatest extent possible through the use of 
pseudonyms; secure storage of all audio files, transcripts, field notes, and informed consent 
forms; password-protecting documents containing participants’ full names and contact 
information; and careful selection of any direct quotations to avoid including those that could 
contain identifying information (ibid.). Additionally, I chose a transcription software that did not 
require me to upload audio files to the cloud and that did not permanently store the completed 
transcripts or audio files. The transcriptionist I worked with also signed a confidentiality 
agreement and I sent all audio files to her using a secure file share software. 
Reciprocity  
Finally, I aimed to build reciprocity into the research process whenever possible. 
Historically, research has often benefitted those conducting it by advancing their careers or 
increasing their status while failing to have a significantly positive impact on participants’ lives 
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(Corbin & Morse, 2003). I did not want to reproduce this trend, especially given the emotional 
vulnerability participants demonstrated during the interviews and how critically important issues 
of access to healthcare are to SM-GNC communities. I aimed to demonstrate reciprocity firstly 
by compensating participants for their time and energy in participating in the interviews. I also 
considered the implications of transforming participants’ experiences and voices into academic 
texts that do not provide translatable knowledge that benefits participants (Abell & Myers, 
2008). To that end, I intend to produce and distribute a white paper that summarizes any findings 




Chapter 4: Mental Illness and Subjectivity 
 This chapter discusses participants’ processes of sense- and meaning-making around the 
nature of mental illness as relative to biomedical discourse, the points of contact between mental 
illness and SM-TGD identities, and the complex relationship between distress, medicine as a 
reifying force, and subjectivity. In order to do so, this chapter first discusses poststructural 
approaches to subjectivity and the development of a biomedical model of mental illness that 
came to replace previous psychanalytic approaches to mental distress in order to contextualize 
the study’s findings.  
Poststructural Approaches to Subjectivity  
 Poststructural approaches to subjectivity reject historical understandings of the self as 
stable, unified, and either naturally occurring or constituted automatically based on social roles 
(Kelly, 2013; Mansfield, 2000). Instead, these approaches are based on the notion that 
subjectivity is fluid, multifaceted, contextual, and constituted within discourse (Fawcett, 2008; 
Fisher & Freshwater, 2014). Specifically, discourses, or expert systems of language (Henderson, 
2015), “establish meaning that is related to the exercise of power” (Fisher & Freshwater, 2014, 
p.198) and create taken-for-granted knowledges and social roles that individuals draw upon to 
constitute their subjectivity (Fawcett, 2008). Discourses and the truths they establish operate 
through and are maintained within language (Fisher & Freshwater, 2014), and make available 
various positionings and story lines that shape and constitute subjectivity (Davies, 1992). 
 Poststructural approaches to subjectivity have sometimes been critiqued as limiting the 
potential for agency and resistance by casting subjects as little more than passive victims of the 
operation of power through discourse (Budgeon, 2015; Fisher & Freshwater, 2014; Lupton, 
1997). However, other authors acknowledge the impact of power and its attendant norms and 
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truths on subjectivity but reject the notion that the constitution of subjectivity through discourse 
is an entirely deterministic process (Budgeon, 2015; Gill, 2008). Such authors instead approach 
the relationship between discourse and practices of subjectivity as dynamic and characterized by 
negotiation and resistance as opposed to a totalizing imposition of power (ibid.). This study takes 
the latter approach and is premised on the notion that subjects “subvert and reconfigure their own 
discursive subjugation” (Fisher & Freshwater, 2014, p. 204) in ways that involve complex and 
highly personal negotiations.  
The Biomedical Model of Mental Illness   
Lupton (1997) argues that from a poststructuralist perspective, “individuals’ lives are 
profoundly experienced and understood through the discourses and practices of medicine and its 
allied professions” (p.95). Medical knowledge and practices are integral to the constitution of 
bodies and subjectivities, but this has historically taken on different contours based on the 
shifting systems of knowledge and related practices associated with various medical paradigms 
(Foucault, 1975; Lupton, 1997). This section offers a historicized discussion of the rise of 
biomedicine as the dominant way of understanding mental health and illness in the contemporary 
Global North. Specifically, it discusses the shift from the psychodynamic paradigm to the 
biomedical, including the more recent trend towards an increased focus on the organic brain and 
neuroscience (Rose, 2007). 
From the 1900s to the 1970s, “psychiatry’s ruling psychodynamic paradigm viewed 
mental disorders as conflicts of personality and intrapsychic conflict” (Mayes & Horwitz, 2005, 
p.249). Symptoms of mental disorders were considered to be expressions of underlying 
psychological problems or conflicts, reactions to adverse life events, or an inability to adapt to 
one’s environment (ibid.). Though mental disorders ranged in severity and presentation, they 
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were all thought to be reducible to this same set of psychosocial processes. Accordingly, 
disorders were considered to exist on a spectrum of normality as opposed to being discrete 
illnesses and diagnosis did not play a significant role in psychiatry (LaFrance & Mackenzie-
Mohr, 2013; Mayes & Horwtiz, 2005). Psychotherapy was the standard treatment for mental 
disorders across the spectrum of severity and tended to focus on an individual’s personality, 
social environment, and life experiences (ibid.). 
However, the 1980s marked a radical shift away from psychoanalytic understandings of 
mental disorders in favour of a biomedicalized approach (Lafrance & McKenzie-Mohr, 2013; 
Mayez & Horwitz, 2005). Integral to this shift was the publication of the third edition of the 
American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM) in 1980. Instead of being based on psychoanalytic theory as had been the case with the 
first two versions of the DSM, the DSM-III presented a new biomedical model of mental illness 
that reframed mental disorders as distinct, clinical entities (ibid.). These disorders were now 
considered to have identifiable and measurable symptoms which reflected “a conception of 
specificity in underlying pathology” (Rose, 2007, p.199). Accordingly, diagnosis based on 
standardized criteria therefore became the cornerstone of psychiatric practice (Mayes & Horwitz, 
2005).  
The biomedical recategorization of mental disorders also evidenced psychiatry’s 
increased focus on “the somatic underpinnings of psychopathology” (Trimble, 1996, p.19). More 
specifically, Nicolas Rose (2007) suggests that the decade between the mid-1980s to mid-1990s 
marked a shift towards an increased focus on the pathologies of the brain. Brain structures, 
functions, and chemicals that were once “hypothetical, tentative epistemic objects” (p.190) were 
reconceptualised as facts, established via the results of clinical research and, eventually, scanning 
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and imaging technologies capable of rendering visible the internal structures and activities of the 
brain (Rose, 2007; Rose & Abi-Rashed, 2014). These technologies played a key role in the 
reification of the mind and any mental dysfunction as products of the organic brain, in the sense 
that “when the mind seems visible within the brain, the space between person and organ flattens 
out – mind is what brain does” (Rose, 2007, p. 198).  
In addition to the changes outlined above, the biomedical recategorization of mental 
disorders also created new opportunities and incentives for the development of pharmaceuticals 
targeting specific diagnoses (LaFrance& McKenzie-Mohr, 2013; Mayes & Horwtiz, 2005). The 
pharmaceutical industry profited immensely from the proliferation of clinical diagnoses as 
pharmacological interventions came to replace talk therapy as the leading approach to treating 
mental illness (ibid). The new disorders outlined in the DSM-III were presented as distinct, each 
with a “unique etiology and prognosis, amenable to a specific kind of treatment” (Rose, 2007, p. 
199), which allowed the pharmaceutical industry to develop drugs in tandem with the 
development of new disease categories (ibid). Moreover, 64% of the stakeholders involved in the 
development of the most recent version of the DSM (the DSM-5) were associated with the 
pharmaceutical industry (Lafrance & McKenzie-Mohr, 2013), illustrating the continued 
inseparability of biomedicalized psychiatry and corporate interests.  
Ultimately, biomedical or neurochemical approaches to mental illness have come to hold 
master status relative to all other understandings of mental distress in the Global North (Lafrance 
& McKenzie-Mohr, 2013; Mayes & Horwtiz, 2005). Biomedical discourse establishes certain 
taken-for-granted knowledges about mental illness that “[permeate] our understandings of 
identity and experience…not because [they] reveal ‘truth’, but due to [their] ability to construct a 
particular version of reality” (Lafrance & McKenzie-Mohr, 2013, p.120). In the context of this 
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hegemonic worldview, the historical circumstances in which biomedical understandings of 
mental illness emerged and the power, legitimacy, and regulatory capacity they afford the 
medical professions are rendered invisible (ibid.). As will be touched on briefly in chapter six, 
this has positioned medicine as a powerful institution of social control with the authority to 
define and normalize certain behaviours and subjects (Conrad, 1992).  
Understanding the Nature of Mental Illness  
Biomedical discourse as described above serves as a powerful set of discursive resources 
that help shape individuals’ understandings of mental illness as well as their subjective 
experiences of mental illness or emotional distress (Lupton, 1997; Ottewell, 2018; Ringer, 2013). 
This section describes some of the ways that participants made sense of mental illness relative to 
biomedical discourse and also aims to illustrate the points of contact between these 
understandings and SM-TGD identity. Though most participants understood and described their 
experiences in ways that drew upon or upheld biomedical definitions of mental illness, the 
primacy of biomedical discourse took varied forms across participants’ accounts.  
At one end of the spectrum, some participants considered experiences of mental illness or 
emotional distress to be conclusively, though not necessarily exclusively, biologically based. For 
example, Blythe, a queer, cisgender nursing student who began experiencing mental health 
problems at the age of 12, expressed the belief that her experiences of emotional distress were 
fundamentally related to the functioning of her body. In Blythe’s words:  
Like yeah, I know that it, there definitely is like a chemical imbalance going on in there 
[in her brain], for sure. Like there's no doubt that, mental illness, is also, affected by 
outside factors. But I think it does start, in the brain. Like it starts in the body. 
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Blythe draws directly and explicitly on biomedical discourse in her reference to brain chemistry 
and by locating mental illness in the brain (Rose, 2007), and her subjective understanding of the 
nature of mental illness clearly aligns with dominant psychiatric framings of mental illness.    
 Quinn, a 24-year-old non-binary trans participant who frequently struggles with anxiety, 
also spoke about the relevance of the body to experiences of mental illness. Though Quinn 
attributes many of their mental health difficulties to the trauma of growing up in an “emotionally 
chaotic home environment” as opposed to pointing to an inherent biological cause, they believe 
that physiological processes underlie the experience of anxiety itself.  For example, Quinn shared 
a story about a day when their workplace was under construction and the noise left them too 
anxious to do their usual administrative tasks. They drew on what they referred to as “medical 
knowledge” about the physiological processes associated with anxiety to describe and make 
sense of their experience:  
…my brain physiologically, thinks that there is a threat. I am in fight or flight mode, right 
now. And so, all of my brain energy is hijacked, to, get me to make a decision, about 
whether, I can take on, this, like, threat. Or whether I need to get out of dodge. And so no 
duh I can’t answer my emails. Physiologically I cannot answer my emails. 
Though Quinn does not discuss their experiences of anxiety as starting in the body so much as 
manifesting there, they draw very directly on biomedical discourse in the language they use 
around the fight or flight response and in their reference to the brain. Quinn ultimately found 
“medical knowledge” to be a useful tool in making sense of their experiences and in this case, 
shifted any blame for their struggle to be productive from the personal to the physiological 
(Ringer & Holen, 2016).  
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Other participants accepted the positioning of mental illnesses as biomedical entities but 
expressed that acceptance in subtler or less direct ways. For instance, Damien, a 24-year old 
pansexual, transmasculine undergraduate student, stated that: 
Like, a lot of, or at least like, definitely like partially, my emotional like instability. Was 
not just like, thought patterns. There was something going on [emphasis added]. And, 
taking a mood stabilizer has really helped that.  
Damien’s assertation that a mood stabilizing medication helped address the “something” that was 
going on and the distinction they drew between that something and thought patterns (as a non-
physiological component of mental illness) suggests that what they are referring to is brain 
chemistry. This in turn implies at least some degree of acceptance that their “emotional 
instability” can be appropriately categorized as a biological illness. More specifically, the fact 
that psychiatric pharmaceuticals primarily act on neurotransmitters reinforces the idea that 
mental disorders are reducible to neurochemical issues (Rose & Abi-Rashed, 2014). Individuals 
who find that psychiatric medications help alleviate distress may then accept the categorization 
of their distress as mental illness (Ottewell, 2018) or locate their problems in the brain 
specifically (Ohlsson, 2016).  
Other participants took a somewhat more psycho-social approach in their understandings 
of mental illness, as is a typical alternative to biomedical discourse in making sense of distress 
(Ringer & Holen, 2016). Specifically, several participants acknowledged the role biology or 
physiological processes play in contributing to mental illness but also emphasized the relevance 
of trauma, lived experience, and social environments. For example, Morgan, a 28-year-old 
cisgender lesbian social worker, discussed the impact of trauma and social environment in 
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contributing to emotional distress. When I asked Morgan if she identified as having a mental 
illness, she replied:  
Some days I want to resist, that. And point fingers at, societal problems and family 
problems and say, like this [mental illness] doesn’t exist, if not for. In other ways like I 
believe in the brain. And the brain, you know proves time and time again, that, like 
because of trauma, you know, the brain looks different. And like, there is such a thing as 
dopamine, and serotonin. 
Morgan appears to straddle social and biomedical framings in her understanding of distress 
which illustrates the fact that biomedicine and less dominant discourses around mental illness are 
not mutually exclusive (Speed, 2006). Specifically, Morgan clearly attributes significant weight 
to trauma and adverse lived experience as relevant contributors to distress, but she also draws on 
elements of biomedical discourse in her reference to neurotransmitters and the impact of trauma 
on physical brain development. Morgan’s comment subtly pushes back against the taken-for-
granted nature of biomedical framings of distress but does not categorically reject them.  
Nicki, a 45-year-old cisgender lesbian high school teacher and guidance counsellor, took 
a similarly negotiated stance on the nature of mental illness. Like Morgan, she explicitly 
discussed the role trauma can play in contributing to experiences of mental illness but did so in a 
way that still evidenced a degree of acceptance of biomedical framings. When I asked Nicki 
whether she identifies as having a mental illness, she stated that:    
That’s a really good question, cause I feel, the older I get, the more I think that, I don’t 
wanna say that mental illness isn’t real, mental illness is real, but I think it’s more about 
unresolved trauma, than it is about any kind of inborn thing. Like I think you can have a 
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genetic disposition towards bipolar or schizophrenia or whatever it is, but I really think 
that you have to have the lived experience that puts that into motion kind of thing. 
Similar to Morgan, Nicki emphasizes the importance of lived experience in contributing to 
mental illness but identifies physiological factors (in this case, a genetic predisposition) as the 
link or mediating factor between experiences of trauma and mental illness. Her categorization of 
mental illness as “real” is particularly illustrative in that it implies a simultaneous acceptance of 
mental illness as a biomedical entity and rejection of the notion that mental illness can be entirely 
reduced to something “inborn” (or in other words, biological).  
Mental Illness and SM-TGD Identity  
While the literature points to a relationship between mental illness and marginalized 
sexual/gender identity insofar as SM-TGD persons are disproportionately likely to experience a 
variety of different mental health challenges (CMHA, 2017; RHO, 2015), comparatively less is 
known about how SM-TGD individuals themselves make sense of the relationship between their 
sexual or gender identities and experiences of mental illness. This section discusses some of the 
ways that participants in this study understood the relevance of their identities to their 
experiences of distress.  
 Most participants initially rejected the idea that their sexual or gender identity and 
experiences of mental illness were connected. This was somewhat unexpected given the level of 
enthusiasm this study generated amongst participants and the political connotation of queerness 
as compared to other sexual minority identities. The study as I first conceived of it was premised 
on the notion that specifically queer-identified people were likely to be relatively critical of 
biomedicine and the historical medicalization and pathologization of homosexuality and 
transgender identities by psychiatry. I imagined that individuals recruited for this study might 
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approach mental illness less as a biomedical entity and more so as a socially produced and 
defined set of experiences and focus on the ways that oppression can be related to 
disproportionate rates of mental illness in marginalized communities.  
However, as outlined in the preceding section, participants in this study generally 
understood mental illness through a biomedical lens or emphasized the physiological impacts of 
trauma as opposed to the ways that systemic oppression and marginalization can function as 
forms of trauma. Many participants approached the link between mental illness and sexual or 
gender identity from a similarly individualized position. Though most participants clearly 
articulated their belief that mental illness is a pressing issue in SM-TGD communities, 
comparatively few believed that their personal experiences of mental illness and their sexual or 
gender identities were connected. There was a clear disjuncture between what participants 
understood to be true at the level of their community and how they discussed the relationship 
between their individual experiences and sexual or gender identities.  
It became clear over the course of the interviews that this disjuncture was in part a 
product of participants’ perception that a relationship between experiences of mental illness and 
identity would be evidenced primarily by emotional struggle surrounding one’s gender or sexual 
identity or a desire to discuss those identities in therapy. Most participants had not sought 
therapy to discuss issues related to their identities and therefore stated that they did not consider 
their identities and experiences of distress to be related. Nonetheless, many participants also 
discussed the ways that various forms of identity-specific marginalization or social exclusion 
negatively impacted their mental health. This suggests that many participants did in fact 
experience their identities and mental health as linked in some capacity, even though a 
comparatively small number explicitly identified that connection. 
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Morgan was the exception to this trend in that she discussed the relationship between 
mental illness and SM-TGNC identity very directly and emphasized the importance of social 
factors. She stated that: 
I think it’s really hard, to [pause], stay well in a really, homophobic, transphobic society. 
So it’s hard to know what comes first [marginalization or mental illness], but I know 
they’re all connected….when you live in a homophobic and transphobic society, 
something has to suffer in yourself.  
Though Morgan’s general understanding of mental illness (as discussed earlier in this chapter) 
appears to align fairly closely with biomedical framings, Morgan takes a somewhat contradictory 
stance here and emphasizes the impact of marginalization on SM-TGD people’s mental health.  
Morgan’s point was exemplified in several other participants’ accounts, though those 
participants did not directly identify a link between marginalization and distress in the way that 
Morgan did. The negative emotional impact of encountering homophobia, transphobia, or 
microaggressions in daily life was most clearly illustrated in several trans participants’ stories. 
For example, Aaron, a 19-year-old pansexual and transgender student, discussed the fact that 
being misgendered at work contributes to his depression (or feeling low, as he describes it):  
… it made me sad. Like especially in the past couple years of my job, cause I’m, I was a 
cashier, um, when customers would tell their kids “Give it to the lady, she’ll scan it for 
you”, or call me a pretty girl, stuff like that, my heart just drops … the actual 
misgendering just gets me low. 
Though Aaron did not frame his trans identity and experiences of distress as related, this 
comment clearly demonstrates that experiencing and coping with transphobic microaggressions 
can have a cumulative detrimental effect on mental health (Nadal et al., 2012; 2014).   
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Further, while Robyn, a gay, non-binary trans person, explicitly noted that they never had 
“problems with” being queer or non-binary, they also spoke quite directly about the emotional 
impact of not feeling accepted as a trans person and the worries they have around what their 
identity might mean for their future employment: 
I wasn’t ashamed of being trans. But I felt like, I should be? So, it was like [pause], it 
really changed my, thoughts on like where I fit, in society. And even now like in, the 
job search like there’ll be certain positions I apply for and I’m like I really want this job 
but I’m, know I’m not going to get it because I’m trans. And, kind of just like, knowing 
that, kind of really affects my mental health.  
Robyn’s comments point to the contradictory nature of their understanding of the relationship 
between their queer and trans identities and their mental health. On the one hand, Robyn did not 
struggle with identifying as queer or trans and did not want to discuss their identities in therapy, 
so their identities and distress must be distinct. On the other hand, however, Robyn can clearly 
articulate the ways that transphobia has negatively impacted their mental health. This clearly 
illustrates the nature of subjectivity and processes of sense-making as “often fraught with 
ambivalence, irrationality, and conflict” (Lupton, 1997, p.106).   
In addition to the negative impacts of transphobia that Aaron and Robyn identified, a lack 
of familial belonging and support was another point of contact between SM-TGD identity and 
mental illness for several participants in this study. For example, Aaron described a decline in his 
mental health after coming out to his family in high school and not receiving their love or 




And like, then of course I would just get low and shut down and sit there quietly and not 
be able to speak. And um, that had a lot of impact? Like especially just it being my mom, 
her being so angry… And so just getting in trouble so much, for bringing it up, um I was 
called like a problem child, and stuff. Um, so just getting punished and facing 
consequences for trying to own up to my identity… 
These interactions had a significant emotional impact for Aaron and suggest a second point of 
connection between his trans identity and experiences of distress.  
Not being accepted by family can also have practical or financial consequences, which in 
turn can compromise mental health. For instance, Robyn remembers being worried that they 
would be kicked out of the house if their father found out that they were gay. They also 
discussed their father’s negative reaction to their trans identity and decision to get top surgery 
and noted that even though they do not desire a close relationship with their father, not having 
his support still has important implications:  
And like, even though I’ve always had mental health issues like, I’m not close to, my 
dad, so. It was never something that like, I ever talked about with him? And it’s probably 
not something that I ever would, talk about with him. But, and that’s like kind of what 
[pause], makes things difficult for me like now at the moment. Where like, I’m having 
mental health issues, and my friends are like not really available, because they’re like. 
Out working their jobs and living their lives, but. I don’t have like a family to like fall 
back on. 
While a lack of familial acceptance and support can itself be detrimental to SM-TDG persons’ 
mental health (Ryan et al., 2009; Ryan et al., 2010), stories like Robyn’s also demonstrate that 
not having family relationships as an option for informal emotional support can compound 
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experiences of mental illness for SM-TGD individuals. Other participants whose families did not 
accept their gender or sexual identities expressed similar worries about losing familial financial 
support or access to insurance coverage for therapy and having limited other options to fall back 
on.  
Finally, some participants discussed about the emotional repercussions of keeping their 
sexual or gender identities a secret from family. For example, even though Anderson, a 23-year-
old cisgender bisexual student, was extremely apprehensive about telling her mother she was 
bisexual, it eventually became emotionally untenable for her to continue to keep her sexuality 
and her partner a secret: 
 …so like, I’ve had bad mental health for a long time, and I think that, until I came out to 
my family like fully, it was just like, completely unmanageable to an extent, cause like, I 
don’t know there’s like the whole existential side of it, where it’s just like, I know who I 
am, but the people I care about don’t know who I am, so like am I really who I say I am, 
if I’m lying about it to the people who, are like, my links in the world? 
Anderson remembers feeling like a “real person” after disclosing her bisexuality, even though 
her mother’s initial reaction was not supportive. As has been documented among other SM-TGD 
persons (Meyer, 2013), Anderson’s mental health has improved now that she is not hiding her 
identity from such an important person in her life. 
Relationships to Medication and Diagnoses 
This section addresses participants’ experiences with being prescribed psychiatric 
medications and/or receiving official diagnoses of mental illness, as well as the relationship 
between those processes and subjectivity. Although individual responses to diagnoses vary 
widely, experiencing diagnoses as validating and/or legitimizing is quite common (LaFrance & 
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McKenzie-Mohr, 2013). Diagnoses also construct illnesses as having an independent reality and 
reify them as objective biomedical entities (LaFrance & McKenzie-Mohr, 2013; Tucker, 2009). 
Many participants in this study attributed significant epistemic weight to medication and 
diagnoses while still integrating their own subjective knowledges into processes of sense-making 
and understandings of selfhood.  
The Role of Medication in Processes of Meaning-Making 
Many participants in this study were prescribed medication for mental illness and this 
took on a variety of different meanings for individuals. For example, for Katie, a 23-year-old 
cisgender queer student, being prescribed medication carried a very specific type of authority 
that overrode the subjective meaning she assigned to her own experiences: 
…taking medication really like, legitimized it, like there was no, um, you’re just going to 
therapy and maybe, maybe you’re making half this shit up, you know like, um, it was 
like, it was very like, hard science it felt like.  
While Katie could have been “making things up” in interpreting her distress as severe or 
meaningful, being prescribed medication validated the fact that her experiences were in fact 
significant by granting them the epistemic weight of science (Ohlsson, 2016; LaFrance & 
McKenzie-Mohr, 2013).  
Damien was a second participant who assessed the severity of their experiences of 
distress partially in reference to the medication they take. In reflecting on their mental health 
prior to taking psychiatric medication, Damien stated that: 
Like sometimes I wonder like, do I really need this [their medication] like anymore? 
Like how bad was it? But I'm like, I don't want to, find out how bad it was. Because it 
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must have been pretty fucking bad. If I'm on like this dosage, of like this medication. It 
must have been pretty bad. So. 
Like Katie, Damien’s ambivalence towards the severity of their distress was overridden by the 
defining authority they granted to medication, based on its association with medical expertise 
(Ohlsson, 2016). 
For Carlos, a 40-year-old cisgender gay graduate student, taking medication to help him 
manage his anxiety did more than just legitimize his distress as significant: taking medication 
reified his experiences as mental illness (Ohlsson, 2016). When I asked Carlos if he identified as 
having a mental illness, he laughed and implied that it was a somewhat absurd question: he takes 
psychiatric medication, so of course he has a mental illness. Medication allowed Carlos to 
recognize himself as ill (Ottewell, 2018) and seemed to preclude the possibility of any other 
interpretation of his experiences. This is exemplified in how Carlos described introducing 
himself to the undergraduate students he teaches: 
First thing I say, look I say “Okay, I’m your TA, I am ah, queer, and I’m totally crazy.”  
And they laugh and I’m like “No, I mean it, I am crazy, I take meds.” 
Carlos’s statement “I am crazy, I take meds” makes it clear that these two things are one and the 
same in his understanding.  
 Finally, Aaron interpreted being prescribed medication as conferring the same legitimacy 
to his experiences as receiving a diagnosis would. Aaron’s sense-making around the meaning of 
medication echoes that of Carlos’s in the sense that they both approached medication and 
diagnosable mental illness fundamentally inseparable: 
I think, cause, because ah like how I said that I didn’t think that I qualified, to be 
depressed, I think I started using that to describe how I was feeling, um, once the doctor 
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prescribed me the medication cause to me, that was in essence a diagnosis. And I felt like 
I was actually allowed to ah, use that now. 
Being prescribed medication leant “status” to Aaron’s experiences (Ohlsson, 2016) by indirectly 
categorizing them as mental illness. This new, objective framing of his distress in turn “allowed” 
Aaron to take on the label of depression and, as will be discussed below, some of the associated 
social benefits.  
Diagnosis as a Reifying Force 
Once an illness has been diagnosed (or indirectly diagnosed via the prescription of 
medication, as illustrated above), it leaves the realm of the subjective and “can be ascribed a 
different ontological status as something incontestable and real” (Ohlsson, 2016, p. 12.11). 
Several participants approached their diagnoses in such a way, but this was not a deterministic 
process. Participants’ accounts instead evidence a complex process of negotiation where they 
often grant medicine the ultimate authority in defining their experiences but do not do so in a 
way that entirely discounts their subjective understandings of their distress.  
For example, Katie pointed to the intangible but nevertheless important distinction 
between naming her own experiences as problematic and being diagnosed with a specific mental 
illness:   
Um, but I was like, it felt wild to me, like ‘diagnosed’… it’s hard to describe, like it just 
really felt like huh, like you knew what was coming, and you knew that was the case, but 
there’s something about like having it like, having someone say like “I would consider 
you within this”, you know? 
Katie’s comment that she “knew that was the case” illustrates the fact that she had already 
classified her experiences as problematic or atypical. Even though receiving a diagnosis only 
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confirmed Katie’s subjective understanding of her experiences, that diagnosis still served a new 
“interpretive function” (Ohlsson, 2016, p.12.4) and granted a different meaning to Katie’s 
distress.  
Anderson was a second participant whose account illustrated a negotiation between her 
subjective understanding of her experiences and the biomedical categorization of those 
experiences. In talking about the process by which she had been given a diagnosis, Anderson 
stated:  
I’m a – I’m a very like clinical person, I’m a very logical individual, so for me if, when I 
go talk to my doctor and what I’m explaining to them, they’re able to come up with 
something reasonable and I do the research and that all corroborates and fits then, you 
know, if the shoe fits, then I’ll wear it. It is, it is what it is right? 
Anderson questioned how her doctors were able to “quantify” her experiences and pinpoint 
exactly which illness she had “out of the thousands of things that could be wrong with me”, but 
ultimately accepted that her experiences constituted an objective and diagnosable entity. This 
process of sense-making illustrates a complex form of resistance where Anderson pushed back 
against her doctor’s authority to place her experiences into specific disease categories but was 
simultaneously willing to accept the “overlap of objective science” onto her subjective 
experience (LaFrance & McKenzie-Mohr, 2013). Doing research around the diagnoses her 
doctor suggested allowed Anderson to retain a degree of authority over her own experience 
(Tucker, 2009) while still accepting that “it is what it is”. 
Diagnoses as Dilemmic  
In addition to reifying certain experiences as illnesses, psychiatric diagnoses also confer 
stigma upon their recipients (Ottewell, 2018). In this context, Tucker (2009) points to the 
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dilemmic nature of “seeking to account for distressing events in one’s life whilst recognizing that 
a psychiatric explanation brings with it identity-threatening connotations” (n.p.). In other words, 
taking on the label of mental illness validates and legitimizes one’s experiences but is also 
stigmatizing (Ringer & Holsen, 2016). Participants’ various responses to and feelings about their 
diagnoses evidenced both sides of this dilemma.  
On the one hand, some participants experienced their diagnoses as a “welcome 
explanatory tool” (Tucker, 2009, n.p.) that validated their distress as real and significant enough 
to warrant care or allowed them to better understand their experiences. For example, Kelly, a 34-
year-old queer and genderqueer university staff member, initially felt angry about receiving a 
diagnosis of episodic major depressive disorder (MDD) and was not interested in the single 
benefit they thought the diagnosis made available to them: medication. Kelly stated:  
I was sort of mad about it. Because [pause]. It was clear, like it was bad enough that it 
was clear to me that there was something very wrong with me [pause]. And being able 
to put a label on it didn’t really impact anything because [pause]. With the diagnosis 
they could give me the option of [pause], of, getting a prescription. But [pause], at the 
time I wasn’t really ready for that. 
However, Kelly eventually experienced the diagnosis as legitimizing and practically useful:    
It helped me understand [pause]. Later on I was happy, to [pause], know that it wasn’t 
all in my head do you know what I mean? Like I was happy to, to be able to say like I 
understand [pause], how, this works. And be able to [pause], contextualize [pause], 
episodes in the future. 
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Receiving the diagnosis of MDD ultimately granted Kelly’s experiences an objective and 
understandable reality (LaFrance & McKenzie-Mohr, 2013; Ohlsson, 2016), which shifted their 
relationship to the label.   
Aaron also experienced his diagnosis of depression as useful in the sense that it could 
help other people understand his experiences. More specifically, labeling experiences as mental 
illness “facilitates the communication of the experience” (Ohlsson, 2016, p. 12.6) and can 
remove notions of personal responsibility or blame for behaviour (LaFrance & McKenzie-Mohr, 
2013; Ohlsson, 2016), both of which were relevant to Aaron. In talking about how the shift in 
how his friends interpreted his behaviour once he attributed it to anxiety or depression, Aaron 
stated that: 
Um, and they’d always write that off as oh he’s so emotional, he’s so reactive, like he’s a 
drama queen, ah was the big one, but being able to ah, come back and be like, actually, 
this is not just me being a drama queen, like this is because of anxiety or depression, and 
um, I’m sorry that you ah, thought I was being too much, but just to explain myself, this 
is what happens. And I mean then, they’re all like “Oh no you don’t have to apologize for 
that!” But, I think it certainly helps, identifying to ah, combat what people say. 
That said, Aaron also drew a distinction between the weight he personally assigns to the label of 
depression and the social weight that label carries: 
…so yea I think just in terms of using that as a label was helpful socially. For myself, I 
don’t know if I put too much weight on it, actually calling myself depressed, I don’t 
know if it um means anything super large to me. It’s not like I am depressed, that’s not 
who I am, um, so I think it has more of a social weight to it.    
57 
 
However, it is important to note that mental illness is not a homogenous category. 
Different diagnoses connate varying levels of stigma and hence have different implications for 
individual and social identities (Ohlsson, 2016; Ottewell, 2018). Though participants like Kelly 
and Aaron ultimately found their diagnoses to be useful, other participants categorically rejected 
the diagnoses they received based on concerns around stigma. Specifically, diagnoses of anxiety 
and depression tended to be relatively well-received by participants while diagnoses of bipolar 
disorder or borderline personality disorder were often met with great resistance. These highly 
stigmatized disorders seemed to connote deviance and pathology to a degree that other diagnoses 
did not, and along with schizophrenia, are often contrasted with “normal” mental illnesses like as 
depression (Ohlsson, 2016; Ottewell, 2018).  
Blythe articulated this distinction very clearly: 
Because you know, like we live in a world, where mental health is talked about more. And 
even though there is stigma, it is it's talked about. You know, a lot of people, talk about 
their depression. A lot of people talk about their anxiety. Even obsessive compulsive. But 
bipolar, it’s just one of those, that like. It's a bit scarier… Like people don't talk about, 
bipolar. People don't talk about borderline. Because they're almost seen as those like 
mental illness that are like, “Hmm. Can't trust that person.” You know [laughs]. 
Other participants described these two disorders as heavy, severe, complex, serious, frightening, 
and “not something that you like to tell people”. One participant even went so far as to reassure 
me that they had not been diagnosed with bipolar disorder after mentioning that they have 
experienced rapid mood swings in the past. These responses clearly illustrate the extent to which 
bipolar disorder and borderline personality disorder are highly stigmatized, and also demonstrate 
that participants were selective in which diagnoses they were willing to take up. Many appeared 
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to perform a cost-benefit analysis, so to speak, and only accepted a diagnosis when the ratio of 
stigma to personal or social benefit was favourable.  
Mental illness and the Self 
Ringer and Holen (2016) argue that determining the boundaries between illness and 
subjectivity is a “core ambivalence that many psychiatric patients experience with the 
construction of diagnostic identities” (p. 167). Mental illness can be positioned as external to or 
part of the self (Ohlsson, 2016), and participants in this study navigated this distinction in a 
variety of different ways. The frequency of symptoms or instances of distress was one factor that 
several participants took into consideration when deciding whether or not to adopt the label of 
mental illness or integrate mental illness into their sense of self. For instance, Quinn views their 
illness as something that continues to exist and remains a part of them even though their 
experiences of distress are intermittent and have improved significantly in recent years. When I 
asked if they identified as having a mental illness, Quinn stated:  
I do, yes. Yeah. I [pause]. I still definitely, even though the patterns are like much less, 
[pause] active, it's definitely still something that I, like struggle with to varying degrees. 
Like on a pretty daily basis…I don't want to just like, come out this, like the other side of 
this whole thing and be like, well that's done. Because like it's not done. I live in a 
different way, I interact with the world in a different way. Because of all this shit…like it 
doesn't really make sense for me to be like, I don't have a mental illness. Except I get 
triggered…That’s like always there. That’s always a part of me. 
 Quinn appears to find it non-sensical to accept that they have ongoing experiences of 
distress but deny that those experiences constitute a mental illness, which illustrates the extent to 
which they have internalized biomedical framings of distress. However, Quinn also points out 
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that they “interact with the world in a different way” based on their experiences and that non-
normative way of moving through the world also appears to carry weight in terms of 
characterizing or constituting mental illness as they understand it. Quinn has not passively 
accepted that they have a mental illness simply or entirely because dominant biomedical 
discourse frames their distress as an illness. They have instead combined psychiatric definitions 
with their subjective knowledge and understandings of their experiences in choosing to define 
their distress as mental illness (Tucker, 2009). 
Other participants attributed very different meanings to intermittent symptoms or periods 
of distress, which illustrates the extent to which “the materials that are used in the configuration 
of identities may share many commonalities, but the configurational acts themselves are highly 
personal” (Fisher & Freshwater, 2014, p. 202). For instance, Kelly rejects the notion that the 
discrete periods of distress they experience constitute a mental illness. Instead, they draw on the 
concept of being “predisposed” to mental illness to make sense of their experiences:  
If I had to identify, I’d probably [pause], identify as being predisposed. But not actively, 
like, constantly actively, having a mental illness. Because [pause]. It’s sort of like 
[pause]. Nine times out of ten I don’t. Except when I do.  
Though Kelly’s distress could be classified as a mental illness (and was when they received a 
diagnosis of MDD), Kelly has rejected a purely biomedical framing of their experiences in 
favour of a subjective understanding that both acknowledges and subtly pushes back against a 
biomedical reification of their experiences. Specifically, Kelly has not rejected the label of 
mental illness outright in that they do identify as predisposed to mental illness. They are also 
amenable to the diagnosis of MDD, partially because it helped them contextualize and 
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understand their distress. However, they are not willing to accept the label of mental illness in its 
more totalizing sense or integrate their experiences of distress into their sense of self.  
 The contextual nature of meaning-making also becomes quite clear in Kelly’s case in the 
sense that part of their rejection of the label of mental illness and desire to keep their distress 
separate from their subjectivity appears to be based in a comparison to others’ experiences. Kelly 
stated that:  
“Like a lot of it is in comparison to, to my wife. Like whose struggle is basically constant 
every day [pause]. It’s, like, if they have a mental illness what I have, is not the same 
scale you know. So.” 
Kelly’s comment illustrates how they have come to understand to their experiences in a highly 
relational way. Specifically, Kelly has used their wife’s experiences as opposed to clinical 
definitions as a reference point for what constitutes mental illness, ultimately drawing on both 
externally assigned and subjective knowledges to categorize and assign meaning to their distress.  
Finally, other participants developed entirely unique ways of describing their experiences 
that avoided the label of mental illness altogether and positioned distress as separate from 
selfhood. For instance, when describing how he thinks about his experiences of emotional 
distress and how they relate to his subjectivity, Jesse, a bisexual transgender student, stated: 
I tend to call it my anxiety goblin and my depression goblin. But I really, am still working 
on like, not, holding on too tightly to the thoughts that they present me. I know that, they 
are, separate, like, they are within me but they are separate from me the person. 
Jesse has clearly objectified his distress in a way that allows him to “represent it as something 
separate and alien from the self” (Ohlsson, 2016, p. 12.9). However, he has not done so in a way 
that resists the medicalization of his distress, as is evident in his use of anxiety and depression as 
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biomedical terms. Ultimately, Jesse seems to be willing to accept that his experiences constitute 
a medicalized entity but is resistant to incorporating those experiences into his sense of self.  
Concluding Thoughts 
Ohlsson (2016) notes that “mental illness presents two interrelated challenges to a person 
that is tying to understand and make sense of their experiences and problems” (p. 12.4). The first 
“concerns the abstract, subjective, and often elusive nature of mental phenomena” (Ohlsson, 
2016, p. 12.4), or in other words, how to make sense of what mental illness is in an ontological 
sense. The second challenge relates to the fact that mental illness “actualizes questions about self 
and identity” (ibid.) and opens one up to stigma (Ottewell, 2018; Tucker, 2009). This chapter 
addresses both of these dimensions. The findings outlined in this chapter suggest that the 
majority of participants understood distress or mental illness primarily as a biomedical entity and 
experience medication and diagnoses as reifying forces. However, this chapter also aims to 
highlight the ways that processes of sense-making around mental illness are not fully determined 
or constrained by the operation of biomedical discourse. Participants often combined psychiatric 
and subjective knowledges in defining their experiences and were selective and intentional in the 




Chapter 5: Constitutive Barriers to Care 
As outlined in chapter two of this thesis, SM-TGD persons may experience a variety of 
different barriers to accessing high-quality and affirming mental health care (McCullough et al., 
2017; O’Shaughnessy & Speir, 2018). Some of these barriers are structural or institutional in 
nature, while others are informal and manifest in interpersonal interactions between SM-TGD 
people and the healthcare practitioners with whom they engage. Frequently encountering these 
barriers negatively impacts SM-TGD individuals’ psychological well-being and can result in 
fewer health seeking behaviours (Quinn et al., 2015) or individuals forgoing care altogether 
(Dean et al., 2016; McCullough et al., 2017; Nadal et al., 2014).  This chapter outlines several of 
the structural and interpersonal barriers commonly encountered by participants in this study and 
aims to demonstrate that these barriers are overlapping and constitutive.  
This chapter first outlines the constitutive approach as advanced by Ewick and Silbey 
(1998) as a means of framing the relationship between the structural and interpersonal aspects of 
barriers to mental health care for SM-TGD people. Specifically, Ewick and Silbey (1998) argue 
that while social structures “appear to have an existence apart from their continuing production” 
(p.41), they are in fact an emergent feature of social relations. This concept helps shed light on 
the ways that formal or institutional barriers to affirming care may appear external to social 
practices but are instead constitutive of them. This chapter then discusses participants’ 
experiences with formal barriers to care, including wait times, a lack of access to long-term 
therapy, and issues of service affordability, before turning to an exploration of participants’ 
interpersonal engagements with healthcare practitioners. In doing so, this chapter aims to 
demonstrate that microaggressions or non-affirming interactions materialize as barriers to care in 
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their own right and also interact with structural barriers in ways that serve to intensify issues of 
access to care for SM-TGD persons.  
Constitutive Theory 
In describing a constitutive theory of law, Ewick and Silbey (1998) argue that “social 
structures, while they confront us as external and coercive, do not exist apart from collective 
actions and thoughts as we apply schemas to make sense of the world” (p.41). Social structures 
are both embedded in and an emergent feature of social relations, meaning that these structures 
are contingent upon and also serve to constrain social practices and individual actions (Ewick & 
Silbey, 1998; Mezey, 2006). Specifically, “the local and minute social practices that contribute to 
the making and remaking of the larger social structures…are in turn informed and constrained by 
the meanings and opportunities available to them by those very structures” (Mezey, 2006, 
p.152). Though social structures appear as reified and external, they are in fact an accumulation 
of small, repeated social actions and processes of individual and collective meaning-making 
(Mezey, 2006). 
Though Ewick and Silbey (1998) and Mezey (2006) discuss constitutive relations 
specifically in the context of law, this approach to the relationship between structure and social 
action or interaction is applicable in other institutional contexts. For example, in theorizing the 
clinical encounter, medical sociologist Carl May (2007; 2011) has emphasized the importance of 
acknowledging the “flow of knowledge and practice from macro-level structures into locally 
formed encounters that take place in private time and space” (May, 2007, p.36). A constitutive 
approach then helps extend May’s ideas about the relationship between the clinical encounter 
and the broader institution of medicine and illuminates the ways that these “locally formed 
encounters” aggregate to shape the institution by which they are also constrained (Mezey, 2006).  
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Structural Barriers to Care 
The first structural barrier that was relevant to participants in this study was the length of 
wait times to access services. In line with general trends around typical wait times to access 
mental health services in Canada (CMHA, 2017), many participants reported that they waited 
upwards of six months to access community mental health services and up to a year to access a 
psychiatrist. Participants went through a variety of different channels to try to gain access to 
services, but the length of wait times did not vary significantly whether the participant personally 
reached out to community or university services, obtained a referral from their family doctor, or 
called the regional mental health and addictions services hotline and asked to be put on a waiting 
list.  
Going without needed supports during those waiting periods can be very emotionally 
difficult (Barua & Ren, 2016; Leobach & Ayoubzadeh, 2017) and several participants in this 
study discussed feelings of stress and hopelessness related to being unable to access support 
services or practitioners for long periods of time. For example, Robyn described their experience 
of being in crisis and exploring every avenue available to them to in an effort to gain access to 
support. Robyn reached out to two community services as well as their local CMHA office to 
request a referral for counseling but was still unable to get the support they needed. Robyn stated 
that:   
I was working, but then like, I ended up having to like quit my job because like I couldn’t 
function. It was really stressful, and I like I reached out to like, every mental health place 
I could possibly think of, and just like couldn’t get help from anywhere. So, it was like, a 
difficult time that I think I’m still recovering from. 
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After eventually being able to access a counseling service but having non-affirming experiences 
with several counselors, Robyn described feeling as if there was no one who would have the 
skills to help them navigate their mental illness or who would be able to understand their specific 
experiences. They ultimately decided to give up on seeking formal supports altogether and have 
“figured out how to deal with it on [their] own”.  
While Robyn expressed feelings of hopelessness and resignation around their experiences 
with care services, other participants experienced frustration or anger related to their experiences 
trying to access supports. For instance, Blythe, who moved to Ontario from a smaller province, 
had expected that it would be easier to access practitioners and services in Kitchener-Waterloo 
than in her home province. Instead, she has struggled to access mental health supports or a 
family doctor and is very disenchanted with the local mental health system: 
I just, I think that you definitely know that healthcare, like access to mental health 
services here are just awful [laughs]. Truly, you know, just the stories I've heard from 
people and like my own experience. It's just so hard.…it’s just a sad, it’s a very sad 
system to me.  
Blythe has taken steps to manage her own mental health in the context of a “sad” local system 
which has proven inaccessible. Specifically, Blythe has kept various resources from previous 
treatment services and support groups and now refers back to those resources when she finds 
herself struggling with her mental health. While Blythe’s resilience and creativity in this capacity 
are admirable, the fact that she has developed this strategy for managing her own mental health 
illustrates the extent to which her options for formal support are limited.  
Further, and as mentioned, the wait times participants encountered to access services did 
not vary significantly based on context. For instance, though most universities now offer 
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dedicated mental health services to students and are increasingly being called upon to improve 
the quality and accessibility of those services (Jaworska, De Somma, Fonseka, Heck, & 
MacQueen, 2016), the majority of participants who were students at the time of the interviews 
expressed frustrations around issues of access to university mental health or counselling services 
that echoed those of non-student participants. This aligns with broader trends in the literature 
which suggest that wait times remain a significant problem on university campuses as well as in 
the community (Giamos et al., 2017; Jaworska et al., 2016). Some student participants in this 
study were so frustrated and disillusioned with their university’s support system that they did not 
even begin the process of trying to access services after hearing about excessive wait times. 
Similar to Blythe, several student participants who struggled to access on-campus 
supports took individual action in an attempt to find alternative ways of protecting their mental 
health. Specifically, several participants mentioned that their university’s LGBTQ+ centre offers 
peer counselling for SM-TGD students and can help fill in the gaps if primary university mental 
health services are not readily available or well-suited to supporting SM-TGD students. Damien 
was one such student who described their university’s LGBTQ+ peer counseling service as a 
helpful resource in light of a lack of other affirming support options. Damien stated:   
Just having someone, that knows what you're talking about. Just talking to you. While 
also kind of being trained, slightly. So, yeah, it sucks that there aren't, more and more 
obvious resources for, queer students. That really sucks. But there are ways around it. 
Even though there are not many. It is what it is, honestly [sighs]. So, might as well just 
figure out what you can do with it. 
The literature on marginalized students’ access to mental health supports indicates that it is quite 
common for SM-TGD, racialized, and Indigenous students to access student-led groups or 
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centers if they do not have access to affirming formal campus services (Jaworska et al., 2016). 
However, it is important to note that access to this kind of workaround or informal option may 
also be limited in certain cases. For instance, Kelly was previously employed at the same 
university Damien attends and emphasized that access to care is an even more significant 
problem for university staff. Specifically, as a staff member, Kelly did not have access to on-
campus mental health services and was also ineligible for peripheral or informal campus 
supports such as mental health research centres or LGBTQ+ centres.  
A second structural barrier to adequate care that negatively impacted participants in this 
study was a lack of access to long-term services and associated issues with continuity of care. 
Specifically, several participants expressed frustration that some of the primary publicly funded 
counseling services in Kitchener-Waterloo only offer between eight and ten therapy sessions, 
after which, in Robyn’s words, “they kind of want you out”. A limited number of sessions with a 
counsellor made it difficult for participants to fully delve into the mental health or emotional 
issues they were experiencing, especially if those issues were grounded in trauma and 
necessitated an in-depth understanding of the participant’s past experiences.  
Additionally, several local community services offer drop in appointments that allow 
individuals to gain same-day or same-week access to supports, but participants in this study did 
not find this to be a useful solution to the issue of long wait times. For instance, Blythe found it 
difficult to establish trust and connection with counselors she did not see regularly. She stated: 
There are like free drop-in, groups but. It's just not, those weren't for me. I tried them. 
They just weren't. I have a really hard time, warming up, to somebody if I'm like, if I'm 
going to go to a drop-in therapy appointment. And talk to somebody one time. That 
doesn't work for me. Like I need to create, the good relationship with somebody. I need 
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it. I need them to like, understand my history. And, you know. I'm not looking for, just 
one-time advice. 
Blythe’s comment highlights the importance of access to care that is both timely and ongoing in 
order to facilitate trusting relationships between clients and counselors. Though Blythe did not 
refer to her queer identity in discussing her preference for longer-term counseling, it is plausible 
that this may be an especially salient concern for SM-TGD individuals who must trust that 
counselors will be non-discriminatory as well as empathetic and competent (Alessi et al., 2019).  
Some participants experienced issues around continuity of care even when they were able 
to gain access to ongoing counselling. For example, Kelly described their annoyance when they 
met with a certain counselor for an intake appointment during their undergraduate degree but 
were then assigned a different counselor once their regular appointments began:   
It was very frustrating for me to like go in for an intake meeting, with counselling 
services, and like, I felt like I had a good connection with the intake person but that’s not, 
not allowed, and so. You, get booked off for like, another, meeting, like a month and a 
half later. 
Though Kelly was able to access university counselling that was not limited to a certain number 
of sessions, having to see multiple different practitioners and wait several weeks in between 
appointments resulted in them deciding not to access the service. Unsurprisingly, going without 
the resources they needed negatively impacted Kelly’s university experience. They described 
themselves as “bouncing along at the bottom” and “toughing it out” as they tried to manage their 
mental health without adequate support.  
Financial constraints were a third structural barrier to care that was relevant to several 
participants in this study. It also became evident that wait times, a lack of long-term options, and 
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issues of affordability are often interrelated. Specifically, psychologists or counsellors working 
in private practice may have shorter wait times, are often able to work with individuals for longer 
periods of time, and may in some cases be better equipped to provide affirming care (Baldwin et 
al., 2017; Israel et al., 2008). However, private counselling is also much more expensive than 
university or community-based services (ibid.). In the context of this study, participants who had 
non-affirming experiences with community services but did not have significant financial 
resources were left in a particularly damaging situation. For example, paying out-of-pocket for 
therapy seemed to be Kelly’s only option for accessing affirming therapy after they had a 
negative experience with their subsidized counsellor. Unfortunately, accessing private 
counselling was not a feasible option for them:  
Like, at the time, like we weren’t doing super well financially so I couldn’t, straight up pay 
for, regular therapy. And I didn’t fit any of the, the, boxes of like groups that have, extra 
funding for like, for, walk-ins and things like that, like… It was sort of like, I, it was a 
matter of like I don’t know where to turn… That kind of thing, like it makes it really, 
difficult to balance and when you’re in sort of that, that state, it’s really hard to deal with 
that additional, level of complexity. 
Kelly’s experience is one example which clearly illustrates the inseparability of structural and 
interpersonal aspects of care for SM-TGD people. Specifically, Kelly’s only option for 
affordable counselling was non-affirming, which, based on their lack of financial resources, left 
them in the position of having to cope with discrimination or forgo counselling altogether.    
Carlos had a similar experience where issues of affordability and discrimination 
intertwined to leave him in a very difficult position. Carlos first described his experience of 
being referred to a practitioner whose fees he could only just afford: 
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So I asked my teacher, I – I told her I say look, I’m having this, this confusion in my mind. 
She says “oh go see a psychoanalyst, can you pay for it?”  “No, I’m poor.” “Okay but, talk 
to her, tell her I referred you.” So, she gave me a nice price. I had to pay for it, was not 
easy but, it afford. And then, yea that’s once a week, cause I could not afford more than 
this. But – but there – that’s – it helped me a lot, a lot yea. 
Despite benefitting from his relationship with this therapist, Carlos eventually found himself in 
the position of being unable to pay for her services outright. He had no option but to switch to a 
community-based service that was less expensive but that he also found less helpful, and where 
the first counsellor he was assigned was blatantly homophobic. Carlos’s experience further 
illustrates the extent to which the structural and interpersonal are constitutive and experienced as 
inseparable. Like Kelly, Carlos was left in a position where formal and informal barriers 
overlapped in a way that reduced his options to either unaffordable care, non-affirming care, or 
no care at all.  
The complex relationship between issues of affordability and institutionalized hetero- and 
gender normativity was also illustrated in several participants’ experiences working with student 
practitioners at subsidized mental health services. Specifically, several participants found that 
while subsidized community mental health services are more affordable than private 
practitioners, they are also more likely to be staffed by less experienced psychology or social 
work practicum students. This added an additional level of complexity to the process of 
accessing high quality care in the sense that affordability once again came at the expense of 
affirming care. While participants were careful to acknowledge that practicum or placement 
students can be just as skilled as more experienced practitioners, several participants had non-
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affirming experiences with students that further complicated the process of navigating barriers to 
accessing support.  
For example, Robyn agreed to work with a placement student at a local community 
mental health service because they were tired of being on a waiting list and this was the first 
option presented to them. Unfortunately, they found that the student counselor did not have the 
knowledge or expertise to engage with Robyn’s experience of abuse and sexual assault in the 
context of a non-heterosexual relationship. Robyn stated that: 
With that particular therapist like, she would slip up on my pronouns, and call me female. 
And then, my abuser, she would slip up and call them male. Because that’s what she 
assumed… And I was like, she thinks that this is the way it happened. And it like, it 
really changes the whole dynamic. When you assume that like, one person is male and 
one person is female.  
This miscategorization of Robyn’s relationship is an example of a heteronormative 
microaggression that undermined Robyn’s trust in their counselor and caused them emotional 
distress (Berke et al., 2016; Nadal, 2013). Though they were able to access the student 
practitioner in a relatively timely matter and through a subsidized service, Robyn eventually 
discontinued their relationship with the student based on her lack of knowledgeability around 
SM-TGD identities and experiences.    
Robyn also encountered a second student counsellor who was not able to move beyond 
heteronormative frameworks for understanding certain topics. Specifically, Robyn found that 
another of their student counsellors did not understand the importance of friends as chosen or 
found family for many SM-TGD individuals who have strained relationships with their 
biological family (Hull & Ortyl, 2019). This limited the counsellor’s ability to help Robyn 
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work through issues they were having with their friends because the counsellor did not attribute 
the same weight to those relationships as Robyn did. As Robyn put it, “[she] didn’t understand. 
That these were my only family.” As mentioned, Robyn eventually decided to forgo counseling 
altogether after having these experiences. This is a well-documented response to consistent 
experiences of non-affirming care (Dean et al., 2016; McCullough et al., 2017; Nadal et al., 
2014) and clearly illustrates the negative impact of institutional heteronormativity on SM-TGD 
persons’ emotional well-being.  
Finally, the process of navigating forms, assessments, or questionnaires that did not 
include options for preferred names and pronouns posed an additional formal barrier for some 
participants in this study, and especially those who identified as TGD. Authors have pointed to 
the relevance of non-inclusive forms as manifestations institutionalized hetero- and gender 
normativity (Berke et al., 2016; Dean et al., 2016; Israel et al., 2008) and as key indicators SM-
TGD persons assess in determining whether or not a service is likely to be affirming (Quinn et 
al., 2015). These were relevant considerations for some participants in this study who 
encountered forms that were tailored to cisgender people. For instance, in talking about filling 
out forms at one of their university mental health services, Damien stated:  
But, with those kinds of things it's always confusing because, I'm like, do I have to use 
my legal name, or, can I use my preferred name? … So, that's always confusing. And, it 
sucks. Because, sometimes like with those assessments specifically, there isn't anyone 
there, to ask…So yeah, that's frustrating. Because there isn't a space that's like, preferred 
name. It's just like, name. And I’m like, I don’t know? 
As Damien’s experience illustrates, having to navigate institutionalized gender normativity 
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can be very frustrating for TGD individuals. Experiences such as this can further the emotional 
distress that individuals seeking mental health supports are already facing and contribute to 
feelings of discomfort and insecurity in healthcare settings (Quinn et al., 2015; Israel et al., 
2008).  
The findings outlined so far point to a nuanced relationship between a marginalized 
identity and the process of navigating structural or formal barriers to care. These findings also 
demonstrate the relevance of micro-level interactions to the functioning of structural barriers in 
the sense that SM-TGD individuals require care that is non-discriminatory as well as timely, 
sufficiently long-term, and affordable. This adds an additional level of complexity to the process 
of care-seeking and proved to be a stumbling block to accessing supports for a number of 
participants. As will be discussed below, SM-TGD individuals also often experience 
microaggressions or problematic interpersonal dynamics that materialize as constitutive elements 
of barriers to care. 
Interpersonal Barriers to Care 
In addition to the structural barriers described above, SM-TGD individuals also 
frequently experience microaggressions or problematic interpersonal interactions with healthcare 
practitioners or staff members (Dean et al. 2016; Nadal et al., 2010; Shelton & Delgado-Romero, 
2011; Nadal, 2013). Participants in this study experienced, or were concerned that they might 
experience, a variety of different forms of discrimination in their engagements with service 
providers. These experiences encompassed instances of blatant homophobic or transphobic 
discrimination as well various microaggressions. These experiences often impacted participants’ 
decision-making around whether or not to disclose their sexual or gender identities and 
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sometimes led to them forgo care altogether. In this sense, these seemingly trivial or discrete 
experiences significantly undermined access to high quality care. 
Discrimination  
The literature indicates that in the present day, SM-TGD persons are more likely to 
experience microaggressions than explicit discrimination both in healthcare settings and in their 
daily lives (Nadal, 2013; Nadal et al., 2014). However, this is not to say that instances of blatant 
homo- or transphobic discrimination do not still occur. When it occurs in therapeutic contexts, 
discrimination tends to be very damaging and may impact SM-TGD individuals’ willingness to 
access mental health support in the long term (McCullough et al., 2017; Quinn et al., 2015). Two 
participants in this study had such experiences of discrimination. Firstly, the most extreme 
instance of homophobia experienced by a participant in this study took place during a 
counselling session at a community mental health service. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, 
Carlos discontinued his sessions with a trusting and affirming counsellor when he could no 
longer afford her fees and instead sought subsidized therapy in the community. When he 
disclosed his gay identity during a meeting with a counsellor at the new service, the counsellor 
was blatantly homophobic:  
Well I got one guy and he was, he wanted to, to talk to me about, about Jesus Christ. I 
know, do you know Jesus Christ? It was, it was horrible [laughter]… Save my soul! That 
was Jesus Christ! Do you know? Have you heard of Jesus Christ – I have – so do you 
know he, he, he has got a plan for you? Scary [laughter]… not right after, but in, in the 
same session, [after] I say, I’m queer…Then I was scared. 
Carlos was able to access a different, more affirming counsellor at the same service and 
laughs about the interaction now, but he has been wary of meeting new counsellors since this 
75 
 
experience. This understandable mistrust and fear deterred Carlos from accessing mental health 
services when he moved to a new city: 
Yea, I – think it’s this um, ah, this, reject – not rejection – this fear … that guy [from the 
previous service], you know, that left me with, you know, I don’t wanna see somebody 
that I don’t know who he is. Or she is, or they are, I dunno. I don’t wanna do that, so 
I’m afraid who is gonna be there...You know, so, so if I feel, I feel insecure. 
At the time of the interview, Carlos had not yet accessed any local counselling services despite 
his ongoing challenges with anxiety, which demonstrates the potentially longstanding negative 
impacts of homophobic interactions with healthcare practitioners (McCullough et al., 2017; 
Quinn et al., 2015).  
Jesse was the second participant in this study who experienced marked, though much 
subtler, discrimination. Specifically, Jesse encountered transphobia in his relationship with a 
child psychiatrist. Though the psychiatrist did not make any overtly transphobic comments to 
Jesse or his parents, she recommended a transphobic resource when Jesse brought up his gender 
identity:  
So the later years of high school. I was, bringing forward to, the psychiatrist, like, hey. 
I’ve got these gender problems and I’d really like to parse them out. And, she, had 
seemed to want to refer me somewhere in Toronto, and my mom was investigating it. 
And she was like well, that’s a conversion therapy thing. And I’m like oh. I don’t think I 
trust this [laughs] psychiatrist anymore. 
Similar to Carlos, this non-affirming experience fundamentally undermined Jesse’s trust in his 
psychiatrist (Dean et al., 2016), which impacted his willingness to continue to access mental 
health supports. Jesse stopped seeing the child psychiatrist and did not access mental health 
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supports again for two years, even though he continued to experience challenges with low mood 
during his final high school years.   
Microaggressions 
In addition to the instances of discrimination outlined above, the vast majority of 
participants in this study experienced microaggressions in their interactions with mental health 
practitioners. Practitioners’ incorrect use of names and pronouns was a particularly common 
experience among TGD participants, and one that often generated anxiety and mistrust (Nadal et 
al., 2010; Nadal et al., 2014). The incorrect use of names or pronouns serves to subtly invalidate 
TGD individuals’ gender identities and also represents a refusal to respect a TGD person’s 
identity in a much broader sense. Métis, trans, and queer social worker Kyle Shaughnessy (2016) 
very clearly articulates the broader implications of practitioners using SM-TGD people’s 
preferred names in particular. He writes that healthcare practitioners using his correct name 
“feels like a signifier of respect…Although it seems very simple, having someone treat me as 
who I say I am…tells me that I will be safe enough accessing their services as support” 
(Shaughnessy, 2016, p.25). In this sense, being addressed by the correct name equates to being 
seen in one’s entirety (ibid.), and this was certainly the case for some TGD participants in this 
study.  
Unsurprisingly, misgendering or the use of an individual’s legal as opposed to preferred 
name can further compound the emotional distress already experienced by individuals who are 
seeking support for mental health (Nadal et al., 2010; Nadal et al., 2014; Sheldon & Delgado-
Romero, 2011). Consider, for example, Damien’s experience. Damien experienced significant 
frustration about being greeted with confusion and blank looks when trying to use their preferred 
name to check in at their regular clinic, even after consistently informing staff that they do not go 
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by their legal name. They expressed frustration that staff were not listening to them and 
explained that this intensified the distress they were already experiencing: 
And, it's really frustrating when I go to university mental health services, to get help 
because I feel shitty, and then just having that extra like kind of like cherry on top. 
Though staff at the counselling service Damien accesses were eventually able to address Damien 
using their preferred name, Damien has given up on advocating for the use of that name at the 
pharmacy where they regularly pick up their medication: 
So over there, I just use my dead name because I’m just like it’s just easier. There's no 
point honestly. So, that's always a shitty experience. 
Damien ultimately decided that being referred to by their dead name (a colloquial term for legal 
name) was preferable to continually having to navigate confusion and resistance on the part of 
pharmacy staff, despite the negative emotional impact associated with this choice. Such feelings 
of hopeless, exhaustion, and a desire to “pick one’s battles” have been documented as a common 
emotional response among TGD persons who frequently encounter microaggressions (Nadal et 
al., 2014).  
Aaron also described the moment of “oh no” that he experiences if he is misgendered 
while accessing a mental health service. For him, part of the anxiety around being misgendered 
is grounded in not knowing how to respond: 
I’m not strictly the best at correcting people. Cause of anxiety, like I just, I think it 
extends back to the whole feeling of not allowed, back in the first time I came out in my 
household, um, and just feeling like you’re not allowed to be this, this is such a burden on 
other people, still carries with me, and if someone misjudges me it takes so much to 
actually be like, um, ‘Actually..’, cause I feel like such an, imposing on them. 
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TGD people who frequently encounter microaggressions often experience feelings of distress, 
anxiety, and being misunderstood such as Aaron has described, and want to appease others and 
avoid conflict in the face of microaggressions is also common (Nadal et al., 2014).  
Damien and Aaron’s experiences both illustrate the critical importance of healthcare 
practitioners and counselors using the correct names and pronouns when engaging with TGD 
individuals. However, and perhaps more importantly, these examples also demonstrate that in 
some cases, TGD individuals find accepting the invalidation of their gender identity more 
manageable than dealing with the emotional repercussions of pushing back against 
institutionalized gender normativity.  
As mentioned briefly in chapter two, an additional microaggression that SM-TGD 
individuals may encounter when accessing mental health services is an unwanted focus on their 
sexual or gender identity, or practitioners who assume that those identities are the cause of 
emotional distress (O’Shaughnessy & Speir, 2018, McCullough et al., 2017). Though 
homosexuality and transgender identities are no longer institutionally pathologized via their 
inclusion in the DSM (Meyer, 2013; Zucker et al., 2013), societal hetero- and gender normativity 
continue to position heterosexuality and cisgender identities as the default against which SM-
TGD identities are compared and deemed abnormal (Fisher, 2013; McCullough et al., 2017). 
Even healthcare practitioners who do not consciously consider SM-TNGC identities to be 
pathological may still assume that these identities are necessarily a source of distress and make 
that the focus of therapeutic interactions (Israel et al., 2008; Shelton & Delgado-Romero, 2011). 
Though participants in this study did not encounter practitioners who pathologized or 
focused disproportionally on their identities (save Carlos and Jesse), many were either concerned 
that this could happen or expressed gratitude for practitioners they had worked with who did not 
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treat their identities as problematic and necessitating extensive discussion. Two TGD participants 
were particularly concerned about how their identities would be received by practitioners, which 
made them hesitant to disclose their identities in order to avoid an unwanted focus on their 
transness. This contrasted with SM participants, who were more likely to have disclosed their 
sexual identities and discussed their appreciation of practitioners who handled their disclosure in 
a casual and matter-of-fact manner.       
For example, Quinn spoke the most extensively about their fears around disclosing their 
gender and sexual identity to therapists or counsellors. Quinn expressed several different 
concerns, the first being that practitioners would focus on their gender identity when Quinn 
wanted their experiences of trauma and anxiety to be the focus of the therapeutic relationship. 
They described themselves as articulate and very aware of what they want to achieve in therapy, 
and they were willing to hide significant parts of their identity and life from practitioners to 
ensure they would be able to work through the issues they wanted to focus on:  
Like for the purpose of this interaction I don't really need a gender. And, I can suspend that 
for like, so that I can try and, get the care that I need… Yeah, and I'm like it's better, if we 
can just breeze past this, and over it. And I'm just going to tell you, what you have to 
know, for us to talk about the situation, but I don't want to go to the place where it's like, 
“Tell me about your gender identity”. Like no. Like that's not why I'm here. 
A reluctance to disclose SM-TGD identity based on concerns about discrimination or to avoid an 
unwanted focus on identity has been well documented among SM-TGD people (Krehely, 2009; 
Quinn et al., 2015). Shaughnessy (2016) describes this as “leaving parts of who we are at the 
door” (p.25) and notes that having to doing so often has negative emotional repercussions and 
limits SM-TGD persons’ ability to fully engage in therapeutic settings. 
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In addition to their concern that disclosing their trans identity would result in an unwanted 
focus on that identity in the context of therapy, Quinn also worried that they might need to 
defend their identity and relationships to practitioners if they were to disclose. This concern 
points to a fear that practitioners might pathologize Quinn’s identity and assume that their 
emotional struggles could be attributed to that identity:  
[It] seems like a complicated thing that I would have to explain and, like. That I feel like I 
would have to defend, and. Then, and I the last thing that I want, is, for someone to, like, 
in a therapy environment…I don't want someone to be like, let's talk about your, 
identities. As if those are actually the problem. Like. I'm not going to be able to trust that 
person, if that's like the line of inquiry that they try and take.  
Ultimately, Quinn stated that they were willing to be “whatever version of myself, that I 
have to [be]” in order to access care that would allow them to focus on their primary issues of 
anxiety and trauma and maintain a trusting relationship with their counsellor.  Given that 
disclosure of sexual or gender identity is related to increased satisfaction with care and better 
physical and mental health outcomes (Baldwin et al., 2017; Dean et al., 2016), Quinn’s decision 
to conceal parts of themselves in order to protect themselves from microaggressions or 
discrimination has important implications. Specifically, this is an example of how interpersonally 
enacted institutionalized hetero- and gender normativity (or fears thereof) manifests as an 
important barrier to mental health for TGD persons.  
Quinn was not the only transgender participant who expressed these fears. Aaron also 
expressed worries about what would happen if he tried to seek counselling for mental health 
considerations that are not related to his trans identity: 
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I’m not sure like, what my experience, especially being trans would be, like I kind of, I’m 
always suspicious, of having to go in and be like, hi, uh, I’m trans, but that’s not what I’m 
here for, let’s focus on this. 
Interestingly, neither Quinn nor Aaron described having previous experiences where 
practitioners had tried to focus on or pathologized their trans identities. Instead, it was an 
awareness of institutionalized gender normativity and the associated potential for discrimination 
that made them hesitant to disclose their trans identities. This illustrates how SM-TGD persons’ 
own protective self-regulatory practices may materialize as a barrier to them receiving holistic 
care.    
Of the participants who did disclose their sexual or gender identities to therapists or 
counsellors, the vast majority expressed an appreciation or preference for practitioners who did 
not have a strong reaction to their disclosure or try to shift the focus of therapy to the 
participant’s identity. This is consistent with previous research that suggests SM-TGD 
individuals often prefer that healthcare practitioners respond to any disclosures in a neutral 
manner (Baldwin et al., 2017). For instance, Blythe was grateful that she and her therapist 
“didn’t skip a beat” when Blythe disclosed her queer identity to the therapist. Aaron appreciated 
that his therapist “just totally got it” when Aaron told them that he wanted to discuss his mental 
health and not his transness, and Katie appreciated that her therapist treated Katie’s breakup with 
her female partner just like any other break up and “didn’t say anything stupid”.  
Katie also made a comment that illustrated the extent to which she did not take it as a 
guarantee that practitioners would react appropriately if she disclosed her identity by mentioning 
that that she was in a queer relationship: 
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I feel like, I’m still twenty-three, you’ve been out for a hundred years, and still I’m 
floored when someone doesn’t go like, “Oh, so you’re gay! Like so you’re seeing - ” you 
know, like they’re just like “Okay, so you’re gay”, and we carry on. 
Other participants expressed similar sentiments of surprise when they encountered practitioners 
who did not reinforce the marginalization or difference of SM-TGD identities by attaching an 
unwanted amount of significance to those identities or to participants’ non-normative 
relationships. These feelings of surprise and the expectation of discrimination which underlie 
them illustrate the extent to which heteronormativity remains a significant problem in healthcare 
settings. 
 A final microaggression that SM-TGD individuals often encounter in therapeutic contexts 
and which impacted participants in this study is a lack of access to practitioners who are 
experienced and knowledgeable in working with SM-TGD populations (McCullough et al., 
2017; O’Shaughnessy & Speir, 2018). This was relevant to many participants in this study, 
though there was a great deal of nuance in how they individually experienced and navigated 
around the issue. For some, practitioners’ limited knowledgeability was a concrete issue that they 
encountered, while for others, it was something they were concerned they might encounter and 
tried to circumvent. The types of practitioner knowledgeability that individual participants 
valued or desired also varied.  
Firstly, some participants worried that the practitioners they engaged with would not have 
an in-depth understanding of SM-TGD identities and lived experiences. Mirroring trends 
documented in the literature, participants did not want to have to teach practitioners about the 
specifics of minority identities, offer additional explanations about their personal identities, or 
“coach” practitioners about “what it’s like” to be a SM-TGD person or in a non-heterosexual 
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relationship (McCullough et al., 2017). However, participants’ concerns about practitioners’ 
knowledgablilty were not necessarily grounded in their interactions with an individual 
practitioner but instead reflected a more general mistrust. For example, in talking about their 
therapist and why they chose not to disclose their trans identity, Quinn stated: 
Like she's never said anything like outright homophobic or transphobic. And I respect 
her, very much. And have been able to do great work in collaboration with her. But, I, 
just don't want to, have to, like, teach her, about, what anything means... I don't know, it 
was one of those like, not quite enough evidence to feel like I could just, fully lean into 
talking about, all of the different identities that I have. 
This once again suggests that Quinn is very much aware of the broader institutional dynamics in 
which their interactions with individual practitioners are embedded, and that a lack of 
knowledgeability is one way that gender normativity may manifest in healthcare contexts 
(McCullough et al., 2017; Quinn et al., 2015).  
Damien also chose not to discuss their gender identity with their therapist because they 
did not think the therapist had a very well-developed understanding of trans identities. Instead, as 
a means of protecting themselves from encountering microaggressions based in a lack of 
practitioner knowledgeability, Damien indicated that if they wanted to focus on their TGD 
identity they would seek out a specialized therapist:  
I heard about like, therapists that specialize in gender therapy. So, part of me is like, I 
need that if I want to talk about my gender identity. Not that the therapist I'm with isn't 
good. But he does not have those experiences, and he has not, studied that kind of 
stuff…So I haven't actually, felt comfortable, or thought it was like appropriate to like 
talk about, my gender identity, in depth with my therapist here. 
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Like Quinn, Damien spoke highly of their therapist and noted that he has been very helpful in 
other capacities. This suggests that a good and otherwise trusting relationship with a practitioner 
does not necessarily override SM-TGD persons’ concerns about that practitioner’s ability to 
provide affirming care.  
Morgan employed a similar strategy to circumvent potential issues around practitioner 
knowledgeability and ensure that she received the type of therapy that was most helpful to her. 
Instead of choosing not to disclose or focus on certain aspects of her identity with practitioners 
based on concerns about their knowledgeability (or potential lack thereof), Morgan aimed to 
ensure that she would only be engaging with practitioners who have the appropriate expertise: 
And so I, when I learned more about, like consuming therapy, I had to, like ask very 
specifically I need narrative therapy, I need trauma-informed therapy, I need a family of 
origin therapist… LGBTQ friendly, like da da da da da… Because I know what to ask 
for, I feel like, I’ve weeded out some harmful people but I know that they exist. 
Additionally, Morgan discontinued her sessions with one therapist very early on after feeling like 
“there was something off.” This aligns with findings from other studies where authors have 
found that SM-TGD people may “read” practitioners and look for clues in behaviour or physical 
office space to determine whether or not a practitioner is likely to be affirming (eg. Baldwin et 
al., 2017). They may then “weed out” certain practitioners if indicators such as verbal cues, body 
language, or use of heteronormative language suggest that a practitioner is not necessarily 
accepting of or equipped to work with SM-TGD individuals (McCullough et al., 2017).  
Discussion  
Though this chapter has presented the structural and interpersonal barriers SM-TGD 
individuals often encounter in healthcare settings in two distinct sections, it has also aimed to 
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demonstrate the mutually constitutive relationship between these two dimensions. Formal 
barriers such as wait times or high costs may at first appear to be identity non-specific, but 
findings from this chapter illustrate that SM-TGD persons’ need for care that is timely and 
affordable is complicated by the fact that that care must also be affirming. Further, 
microaggressions can undermine trust between SM-TGD persons and counselors (Berke et al., 
2016; Dean et al., 2016), cause psychological and emotional harm (Nadal 2013; Nadal et al., 
2014) and even contribute to individuals’ decision to forgo seeking care altogether (McCullough 
et al., 2017). In this sense, microaggressions materialize as barriers to care which are just as 
impactful as formal barriers. Ultimately, conceptualizing the structural and interpersonal aspects 
of care as separate obscures the relationship between these elements and also makes it more 
difficult to see the ways that SM-TGD identity is relevant even in cases where barriers to care 




Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusion 
Based on data from 12 unstructured interviews and grounded in a constructivist 
epistemology, this study explores the ways that SM-TGD individuals in southern Ontario 
understand their experiences of mental illness or emotional distress relative to biomedical 
discourse, and the relationship between those experiences and subjectivity. This study also 
discusses some of the barriers that SM-TGD people often encounter as they seek support for 
mental illness and aims to illustrate the mutually constitutive nature of formal and informal 
barriers in this context. This chapter begins by providing a summary of the study’s findings in 
reference to the three research questions presented in the introduction, and then turns to a 
discussion of the broader insights these findings offer.  
Summary of findings  
This study aims to address the following three research questions:  
1. How do SM-TGD persons in southern Ontario relate to biomedicalized framings of 
mental illness in making sense of their experiences of distress and themselves? 
2. How does SM-TGD identity feature in these processes?  
3. What barriers do SM-TGD participants encounter when seeking affirming mental 
health care in their communities, and how do they perceive and navigate such 
barriers?  
Chapter four of this thesis addresses the first two research questions. Specifically, it describes 
how participants make sense of their experiences of distress in ways that integrate elements of 
dominant discourse as well subjective and contextualized understandings. This chapter illustrates 
that the majority of participants in this study understood mental illness to be a primarily 
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biomedical phenomenon. Even those participants who emphasized the role of social factors in 
contributing to mental illness did so in a way that linked the two via biological processes, and 
biomedical language featured prominently in most participants’ accounts. These findings 
illustrate the degree to which biomedical discourse is hegemonic, even among SM-TGD 
individuals whose identities have historically been pathologized by psychiatry.  
Chapter four also discusses the ways that participants’ SM-TGD identities feature in 
processes of sense- and meaning-making as related to mental illness. In doing so, chapter four 
points to some of the contradictions embedded in participants’ discussions of the relationship 
between their marginalized identities and experiences of distress. Specifically, many participants 
clearly articulated their belief that mental illness is a pressing concern in SM-TGD communities 
but considered their own sexual or gender identity and experiences of distress to be generally 
unrelated. However, many of those same participants also discussed the negative impact of 
homophobia, transphobia, microaggressions, or lack of familial acceptance and support on their 
mental health. This suggests that SM-TGD identity is perhaps more relevant to participants’ 
experiences of mental illness than was explicitly acknowledged.  
Finally, chapter four discusses the complex, fractured, and at times dilemmic nature of 
subjectivity as it relates to experiences of mental illness or emotional distress. This was 
particularly evident in the meaning and epistemic weight many participants assigned to 
psychiatric medications and diagnoses. Many participants who were prescribed medication or 
received an official diagnosis interpreted those events as a) objectively validating the severity of 
their distress, and b) reifying that distress as an illness. The defining authority that many 
participants granted medication and diagnosis often overshadowed participants’ subjective 
understandings of their experiences but did not eclipse those understandings entirely.  
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In response to the third research question, chapter five then identifies multiple barriers to 
affirming care that were relevant to participants in this study. The majority of participants 
encountered formal or institutional barriers to care such as long wait times or issues around 
service affordability. Many participants also experienced microaggressions or discriminatory 
interpersonal interactions with service providers that, though informal, materialized as barriers to 
care that were just as impactful as (and further compounded) issues such as wait times. This 
illustrates the inseparability of the institutional and interpersonal dimensions of care and, as will 
be discussed below, provides insight into the ways that hetero- and gender normativity manifest 
in institutional contexts where inclusivity and non-discrimination are topics of increasing focus 
(DeBord et al., 2017).   
Chapter five also discusses some of the ways that participants navigate these formal and 
informal barriers to affirming care. Findings from this study suggest that SM-TGD individuals 
are acutely aware of institutionalized hetero- and gender normativity and may engage in pre-
emptive strategies to reduce the likelihood of experiencing microaggressions. In some cases, 
even participants who had never experienced discrimination in healthcare contexts were 
mistrustful of practitioners and tried to limit instances of potential discrimination. This often took 
the form of participants concealing their sexual or gender identities from practitioners or only 
discussing issues related to their SM-TGD identities with carefully selected practitioners. Given 
that concealing SM-TGD identity limits practitioners’ ability to provide holistic and fully-
informed care, findings from this study illustrate that individuals’ self-protective strategies are 
themselves constitutive elements of barriers to quality care.   
Together, these two analytical chapters offer an in-depth exploration of some of the ways 
that SM-TGD persons understand and experience mental illness and navigate local mental health 
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services. The remainder of this chapter discusses some of the broader implications of this study’s 
findings, focusing on biomedical discourse as a hegemonic ideology and the ways that hetero- 
and gender normativity are institutionalized in the contemporary healthcare system. This chapter 
then concludes by characterizing SM-TGD individuals’ experiences accessing mental health 
supports as a double bind.  
Biomedical Discourse as Hegemonic   
One of the things this study clearly illustrates is the degree to which biomedical discourse 
around mental illness is hegemonic. Coined in 1957 by Antonio Gramsci, the term hegemony 
refers to “the mainstream deployment and acceptance of ideologies that justify the inequities 
inherent in modern society” (Cook, 2008, p.384). Ways of living, thinking, and understanding 
that maintain and perpetuate existing social structures and benefit powerful groups come to be 
dominant and allow those in power to retain their dominant position through ideological means 
as opposed to force (Cook, 2008; Filc, 2004). Specifically, oppressed groups do not struggle 
against their oppression or challenge the current system because prevailing ideologies make it 
difficult or impossible to imagine a different social reality (Cook, 2008). Hegemonic ideologies 
operate though social systems and everyday communicative practices and pervade various levels 
of social reality, including institutions, culture, private life, and value systems (Cook, 2008; Filc, 
2004). 
Biomedicine currently exists as a hegemonic ideology that serves to individualize, 
desocialize, and depoliticize disease (Filc, 2004; Lupton, 1997; Zola, 1972). Specifically, 
biomedical discourse renders invisible the socially constructed nature of scientific data and 
research practices (statistical analyses, epidemiology, etiology, etc.) and instead presents the 
“facts” derived through medical science as objective, asocial, atheoretical, and morally neutral 
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(ibid.). Signs and symptoms of disease are similarly reified as objectively existing, which 
obscures the social processes inherent to the ways that diseases are studied, categorized, and 
treated (Filc, 2004). These processes of reification and objectification also “deflect questions of 
social inequality into the realm of illness and disease” (Lupton, 1997, p. 96) and present 
individualized medical interventions as the appropriate treatment for illnesses that may be based 
in or exacerbated by marginalization (Lupton, 1997; Zola, 1972).  
Findings from this study illustrate the hegemonic and incredibly pervasive nature of 
biomedical discourse in the context of SM-TGD persons’ understandings of mental illness. 
Biomedical language and concepts infused the vast majority of participants’ accounts of their 
experiences, and of particular interest is that even participants’ practices of discursive 
negotiation or resistance to biomedical categorizations typically evidenced some degree of 
acceptance of biomedical knowledge. This finding is perhaps especially striking given the 
population this study focuses on. As mentioned in chapter four, I had anticipated that SM-TGD 
persons would be particularly critical of biomedical approaches to mental illness based on the 
historical pathologization of SM-TGD individuals by psychiatry and my understanding of 
queerness as a politicized identity. The extent to which biomedical discourse permeated 
participants’ accounts, even as those accounts evidenced considerable agency and resistance, 
clearly illustrates biomedicine’s status as a hegemonic set of knowledges.    
Hegemonic understandings of mental illness as a biological and asocial phenomenon that 
should be dealt with through the institution of psychiatry also has implications in terms of social 
control. Medical sociologists have long pointed to medicine’s function as an institution of social 
control that has “[nudged] aside, if not [incorporated], the more traditional institutions of religion 
and law” (Zola, 1972, p.487). This is accomplished in part through medicalization, or a 
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sociocultural process that involves “defining a problem in medical terms, using medical language 
to describe a problem, adopting a medical framework to understand a problem, or using a 
medical intervention to ‘treat’ it” (Conrad, 1992, p.211). The process of medicalization facilitates 
social control in that it grants medicine the authority to define, surveil, and act upon certain 
behaviours and individuals (Conrad, 1992). 
Mental illness is one example of a set of experiences that have been medicalized, which 
in turn grants the professions of psychiatry and psychology an incredible amount of typically 
invisibilized power (Turner, 1997; Zola, 1972). The DSM and the diagnostic categories it 
institutionalizes become “a tool through which a hegemonic worldview is imposed” (Burstow, 
2005, p.435), and medical professionals retain the power to define what is normal or abnormal, 
healthy or disordered (LaFrance & McKenzie-Mohr, 2013). Specifically, scientific and 
professional knowledges “[establish] normative standards for bodily performance and 
presentation” (Henderson, 2015, p.325) against which individuals can be compared, judged, and 
measured. Those who fail to meet normative standards can then be managed and disciplined 
(ibid.). However, this is done in the name of optimizing health as a moral good, which makes it 
difficult to see the way that the mental health professions function as a potent form of social 
control (LaFrance & McKenzie-Mohr, 2013). 
While these considerations are certainly relevant to this study, perhaps especially given 
that sexual and gender differences have also been subject to normalization via medicalization 
(Turner, 1997; Zola, 1972), I instead chose to focus on “the ways the hegemonic medical 
discourses are variously taken up, negotiated, or transformed” (Lupton, 1997, p.95) at the 
individual level. Authors such as Deborah Lupton (1997) have criticized analyses of social 
control via medicalization as insufficiently attentive to agency and resistance, and Lupton also 
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notes that medicine can also have positive impacts on individuals’ lives by reducing pain and 
suffering. Participants in this study did not discuss feelings of coercion or constraint in the 
context of their engagements with the mental health system, and many emphasized that 
psychiatric medications and mental health professionals have at times played a positive role in 
their lives. In instances when this was not the case, participants took action to seek out more 
affirming care or withdrew from the mental health supports entirely. Participants’ agency was 
not “crushed beneath the might of the medical profession” (Lupton, 1997, p.97), and participants 
engaged with biomedical discourse in ways were at times critical and left room for subjective as 
well as hegemonic understandings of experiences. For these reasons, I chose not to focus on the 
regulatory implications of this study’s findings.   
Compulsory vs Normative Heterosexuality  
Findings from this study also provide important insight into the nature of contemporary 
institutional hetero- and gender normative dynamics in the context of mental health services. 
Specifically, findings from this study support the notion that the social order Adrienne Rich 
(1980) described as compulsory heterosexuality has been replaced by increasingly “nuanced 
patterns of institutionalized sexual-gender social hierarchy” (Seidman, 2009, p.26). Rich’s 
original concept was extremely influential and framed heterosexuality as “an institution, or 
socially formed structural order of patterned sexual-gender divisions and hierarchies” (Seidman, 
2009, p.18). Rich argued that compulsory heterosexuality was embedded in all levels of social 
life from the everyday to the ideological, and was enforced through social institutions, laws, and 
informal regulatory practices such as harassment or violence (Rich, 1980; Seidman, 2009).  
While sexual and gender inequalities certainly still exist in contemporary institutional 
settings, these inequities have begun to take on different contours. Specifically, some authors 
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(eg. Fisher, 2013; Seidman, 2009) have argued that there has been a decline in compulsory 
heterosexuality since the 1990s and suggest that institutions are now characterized by normative 
heterosexuality. Normative heterosexuality is still a regulatory order or “structural element that 
positions bodies and selves into particular sexual hierarchies” (Fisher, 2013, p.502), but unlike 
compulsory heterosexuality, it can coexist with manifest institutional recognition and integration 
of SM-TGD people (Seidman, 2009). Heterosexuality remains the dominant and privileged 
sexual category against which other sexual identities are judged and deemed subordinate, but this 
occurs against the backdrop of fewer state-maintained systemic discriminatory or homophobic 
practices and increased cultural normalization of non-heterosexual identities (Fisher, 2013; 
Seidman, 2009).  
The proliferation of research related to affirming physical and mental health care for SM-
TGD persons (see O’Shaughnessy & Speir, 2018) and publication of various policy documents 
intended to improve the quality of care available to this population (see DeBord et al., 2017) are 
examples of the manifest inclusion of SM-TGD persons in the contemporary healthcare system. 
However, as this study illustrates, these (albeit important) efforts have not yet translated into the 
consistent provision of affirming care for SM-TGD individuals or the elimination of sexual and 
gender-based inequities in the context of healthcare. Participants in this study often encountered 
discrimination or received a lower standard of care based on their SM-TGD identities despite 
increasing institutional recognition of their unique needs, which arguably exemplifies a shift 
from compulsory to normative heterosexuality.  
The Double Bind 
Finally, I argue that findings from this study illustrate that mental health supports as they 
are currently structured often leave SM-TGD people in what feminist scholar Marilyn Frye 
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(1983) has described as a double bind. Frye (1983) argues that one of the most “characteristic 
and ubiquitous” (p.2) features of the world as it is experienced by oppressed or marginalized 
people is the double bind, or a situation where one’s options are reduced to a very limited 
number, all of which “expose one to penalty, censure, or deprivation” (p.2). Specifically, Frye 
(1983) points to the interconnected nature of barriers that may at first appear distinct and 
relatively innocuous, but that are in fact part of a network of forces that is extremely confining. 
She writes that: 
the experience of oppressed people is that the living of one’s life is confined and shaped 
by forces and barriers which are not accidental or occasional and hence avoidable, but are 
systematically related to each other in such a way as to catch one between them and 
restrict or penalize motion in any direction. (Frye, 1983, p.4)  
The concept of the double bind is a useful way of framing some of the primary issues 
identified in this study. Dean et al. (2016) and Hutchinson, Thompson, and Cederbaum (2006) 
have both employed the concept of the double bind to discuss the position in which SM-TGD 
persons often find themselves when they have difficulty accessing affirming care. These authors 
discuss the double bind specifically in the context of disclosure, wherein SM-TGD people may 
feel forced to decide between a) disclosing their sexual or gender identities and risking 
discrimination, microaggressions, or awkward or uninformed reactions on the part of healthcare 
practitioners, or b) concealing their SM-TGD identity, which limits practitioners’ abilities to 
understand and validate client’s experiences and provide fully-informed and holistic care (Dean 
et al., 2016; Hutchinson et al., 2006; navidson, 2016). Findings from this study similarly suggest 
that decisions around disclosure can be characterized as a double bind situation, but also 
illustrate that this bind in many cases extends beyond questions of disclosure.  
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Specifically, this study found that formal and informal barriers to affirming care place 
participants in a double bind where they must make decisions about the following key concerns: 
whether or not to disclose their sexual or gender identities; whether to continue to access non-
affirming or low quality services, go back on a waiting list and try to gain access to potentially 
improved services, or pay out of pocket for an affirming service; and sometimes, whether 
forgoing treatment altogether is ultimately less damaging than continuing to access non-
affirming or low-quality care. These tensions clearly illustrate extent to which formal and 
informal barriers to care are “systematically related” (Frye, 1983) or mutually constitutive 
(Ewick & Silbey, 1998; Mezey, 2006), and interact in a way that left many participants in this 
study with extremely limited options.   
 This study aims to offer an in-depth exploration of how SM-TGD participants understand 
and experience mental illness. It also highlights access to affirming care as a key issue of social 
justice for this population and identifies some of the barriers that currently stand in the way of 
improved access to care. I have aimed to center participants’ voices in this thesis and to that end, 
I wish to conclude with a very articulate quotation from Morgan which encapsulates some of this 
study’s main intentions and findings. In Morgan’s words:  
 
Yeah, I want to believe that, anything that’s produced, and maybe published, that has, 
queer, [laughs] LTBGQ, adds a Google search. Adds, you know, a bulky thing to a shelf 
somewhere. It basically means like we exist. We have needs. They are specific, they are 
not specific. Right? Decency, humanity, authenticity, it’s not specific. Do your research, 
don’t expect us to educate you. You know, be professional. Be thorough…anything, to, 
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Appendix A: Letter of Information and Informed Consent 
Project Title: At the Intersection of Queer Identity and Mental Illness  
Student Researcher: Bridget Livingstone, MA student 
Department of Sociology & Legal Studies 
 University of Waterloo 
 200 University Ave. W.  
Waterloo ON, N2L 3G1 
 Phone: 902-818-9634 
  Email: blivings@uwaterloo.ca  
 
Faculty Supervisor: Kate Henne, PhD  
Department of Sociology & and Legal Studies 
 University of Waterloo 
 200 University Ave. W.  
Waterloo ON, N2L 3G1 
 Phone: 519-888-4567 x 39161 
 Email: khenne@uwaterloo.ca  
  
Hi there! You are invited to participate in a research study being conducted by Bridget 
Livingstone, a queer Master’s student in the Department of Sociology and Legal Studies at the 
University of Waterloo. The objective of the study is to better understand how queer people who 
have experienced mental illness or challenges related to mental health understand their 
experiences and pursue treatment or support. The study’s results will be used to develop 
translatable knowledge about queer individuals’ mental health experiences and needs that may be 
used to improve local mental health services available to queer folks. 
 
To help you make an informed decision regarding your participation, this letter will explain what 
the study is about, the possible risks and benefits, and your rights as a research participant. If 
anything in the letter is unclear, please ask for clarification before consenting to participate. You 
will be provided with a copy of this information and consent form if you choose to participate in 
the study. Thank you for your time!  
 
What is the study about? 
 
It is well documented that queer-identified individuals in Canada experience disproportionately 
high rates of mental illness. Research also indicates that mental health services are rarely tailored 
to queer folks, which can lead to subtle forms discrimination as individuals navigate treatment 
for mental illness. However, little research has explored queer individuals’ perceptions about 
mental illness, the issues they face in accessing adequate mental health services and supports, 




Therefore, the purpose of this research is to explore how queer Ontarians who identify as having 
experienced mental illness or challenges related to mental heath understand those experiences 
and pursue treatment or support. The researcher is particularly interested in the language queer 
individuals use to describe their experiences with mental illness or mental health challenges. The 
study will help generate knowledge about queer folks’ unique mental health experiences and 
needs that is currently lacking. 
 
If you decide to participate in the study, you will be asked to meet with the researcher for an 
interview. The data the researcher collects will form the basis of her Master’s thesis, a summary 
to be provided to policy makers and healthcare organizations, and future academic publications. 
You are also welcome to receive a copy of the completed thesis if you would like.  
 
Your responsibilities as a participant 
 
Participation in the study is entirely voluntary. If you choose to participate in the study, you will 
be asked to meet with the researcher for an in-person interview at a quiet location of your 
choosing. The interview will likely last between 1 and 1.5 hours. You may decline to answer any 
of the questions the researcher asks, and you will be welcome to guide the interview 
conversation in the direction that feels best for you.  
 
The researcher also identifies as queer and has a mental illness, and she aims to be an empathetic 
and non-judgemental listener. You may stop the interview or withdraw from the study by 
informing the researcher at any time, with no negative consequences. With your permission, the 
interview will be audio-recorded and later transcribed to facilitate data analysis. If you agree, the 
researcher would also appreciate your feedback as a part of data analysis. You would be 
provided with the researcher’s developing findings and invited to point out any inaccuracies, 
request clarification, and make suggestions. You may decline to participate in this extra step if 
you wish.  
 
Who may participate in the study? 
 
You may participate in the study if you identify as queer and as having experienced mental 
illness or challenges, problems, or concerns related to mental health - whatever language you use 
to describe your experiences, you’re welcome to participate. You do not need to have a formal 
diagnosis to participate, and you do not need to disclose your diagnosis if you do have one.  
 
Will I receive anything for participating in the study? 
 
You will receive a $50 gift card of your choosing (including Visa gift cards, which are basically 
the same as cash), as well as reimbursement for any transportation costs ($10 to cover bus fares 
or gas and parking costs, if applicable). The researcher wishes to thank you for your participation 
and recognize the time you dedicated to speaking with her. You will receive the gift card 
immediately after the interview, regardless of whether or not you complete the interview or agree 
to contribute to data analysis. Please note that the amount received is taxable, and it is your 




What are the possible benefits of participation? 
 
There are possible benefits to participating in this study. Firstly, participating in the interview 
gives you the opportunity to discuss your experiences with an attentive and non-judgemental 
listener who likely shares some of your experiences. This can be fulfilling or positive for some 
folks, as sometimes it can be difficult to share or process these experiences with others who do 
not share in them. Secondly, you will have the opportunity to contribute to the development of 
important knowledge that is relevant to your community. It can sometimes be difficult to find 
platforms where your voice and opinions are taken into consideration.  
 
What are the risks associated with participation? 
 
There are also emotional risks associated with participation in this study. The researcher 
understands that talking about difficult experiences can be distressing or triggering. Please note 
that the researcher is not a clinician or mental health worker and is not able to offer treatment or 
counselling for mental health concerns. However, she has undergone training that will help her to 
respond calmly and empathetically should you experience distress, and she will also provide you 
with a list of community mental health supports that you may access if you require support.   
 
Will my information be kept confidential?  
 
The researcher is committed to ensuring your anonymity and confidentiality to the best of her 
ability. Your identity will be kept confidential. The only exception to confidentiality is if the 
researcher suspects child abuse/neglect or that you or others are in imminent danger of harm. 
Your name will not be mentioned in the thesis, and any information that might identify you will 
be removed. You may consent to the inclusion of anonymous quotations in the thesis if you wish. 
Additionally, all audio files, transcripts, and consent forms will be kept in a secure location. Only 
the researcher will have access to this information, and it will be kept for a minimum of 7 years.  
 
For all other questions or to discuss any concerns, please feel free to contact the researcher by 
email at blivings@uwaterloo.ca. You may also contact her supervisor, Dr. Kate Henne, at 
khenne@uwaterloo.ca. This study is funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research 
Council of Canada (SSHRC) and has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through a 
University of Waterloo Research Ethics Committee (ORE #23216). If you have questions for the 
Committee contact the Office of Research Ethics, at 1-519-888-4567 ext. 36005 or ore-
ceo@uwaterloo.ca.  
 














Informed Consent to Participate in this Study 
 
Title of study: At the Intersection of Queer identity and Mental Illness 
 
Signing this form does not waive your legal rights or release the researcher or involved 
institutions from their legal and professional responsibilities.  
 
I have read the information presented in the information letter about a study conducted 
by Bridget Livingstone, under the supervision of Dr. Kate Henne, from Department of Sociology 
and Legal Studies, University of Waterloo. I have had the opportunity to ask questions related to 
the study and have received satisfactory answers to my questions and any additional 
details. 
 
I was informed that participation in the study is voluntary and that I can withdraw this consent 
by informing the researcher. 
 
This study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through a University of Waterloo 
Research Ethics Committee (ORE# 99999). If you have questions for the Committee contact 
the Office of Research Ethics, at 1-519-888-4567 ext. 36005 or oreceo@uwaterloo.ca. 
 
For all other questions contact Bridget Livingstone at blivings@uwaterloo.ca. 
  
 Consent and Privacy Options Yes No 
1 I understand that I am voluntarily 
participating in this research, and that I can 
withdraw at any time.  
  
2 I agree to have my interview audio-recorded.    
3 I agree to the use of anonymous quotations in 
the thesis and any publications that come of 
this research. 
  
4 I would like to contribute my feedback as a 
part of data analysis.  
  
5 I would like to receive a copy of the summary 





Participant’s name ____________________________ 
                                                                                                   Date _________________ 


























Appendix B: Recruitment Materials 
 
Do you identify as queer? Do you also identify as 
having experienced a mental illness or a mental health 
problem, challenge, or concern? 
 
Whatever language you use to describe your experiences, I 
would love to speak with you!  
 
 
You are invited to participate in a study that aims to better 
understand the ways queer folks who have experienced 
challenges related to mental health understand those experiences 
and seek support. The study is being conducted by myself, 
Bridget Livingstone, a queer master’s student at the University 
of Waterloo.  
 
 
Participation would involve an in-person interview lasting between 
1.5 and 2 hours, and you do not need to have a formal diagnosis to 
participate. Participants will receive $50 in appreciation of their time. 
 
 




Department of Sociology and Legal Studies 
University of waterloo 
Email: blivings@uwaterloo.ca 
 
This study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through a University of Waterloo 
Research Ethics Committee. 
